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Saturday, January 10, 2009

URGENT ASKING TO PAY ATTENTION ON:GAZA ISSUE









The Ramallah-based Wattan TV has been a force for positive change in Palestinian media. This past September the station received a grant from Internews Network to support the development of five new programs and has participated in several of workshops and in-house trainings. Kevin Nolan, Grants Manager for Internews Network in the West Bank/Gaza, sat down with the Marketing Manager for Wattan TV, Mohammed Ataya, to discuss the relationship between the station and the local community.
Tell me about the vision of Wattan TV.
Wattan TV was founded to provide the Palestinian people with television that is national, independent, and secular. We have a wide variety of programming, including shows that focus on local news and other issues that are affecting the communities. We also believe that the promotion of non-violence is important. Internews Network has been very helpful to us in this process of becoming a modern media station.
Why is it so important for the station to remain secular?
The people of Palestine are quite diverse. There are differences in religion, with Christians and Muslims living together. There are political differences, between Hamas, Fatah, and others. Some of these political organizations even have their own factions. Because of this, we think it is our responsibility to not align ourselves with one of them, but provide everyone with the news as it is.
What does Wattan TV offer the Palestinians that the major regional channels, namely Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, cannot?
As a homegrown Palestinian media outlet, we are able to offer our communities programs that focus on real Palestinian issues. Typically international channels air footage every night that shows fighting in Gaza or of an Israeli incursion into Nablus. While this is news, there is much more to Palestine. One program that Internews is supporting, and has been very successful for us, is called Life Tour. Each week this show features a regular Palestinian who has made remarkable achievements in such fields as art, music, or business. We believe that these aspects of Palestine are very important to show as well.
What role can Wattan TV play in the peace process?
In these times it is important that the Palestinian media report information in an accurate and timely fashion. For example, when President Bush was here a couple of weeks ago, we told one hundred percent of the story, both positive and negative aspects.
We also believe that it is important not to glorify violence, because we remain firmly committed to the idea that peace is the only road to a lasting solution with the Israelis.
What does 2008 have in store for Wattan TV?
Wow. We certainly have plans to make 2008 a big year for Wattan TV. We are hoping to be able to reach the entire West Bank. This is our dream, and we are making it happen.

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Gama TV, a Nablus-based partner of Aswatona, is primarily run by station director Abeer Kilaney. She also serves as the president of the West Bank-wide Sada TV network and is a coordinator for Miftah, an NGO based in Jerusalem that promotes transparency, accountability, and the uninhibited flow of information in Palestinian society. In addition, she is a mother of six. I spoke with Abeer in January, and asked her to tell me a little bit about her background and daily life.
Although she was born in Burqa, a small village outside the northern West Bank city of Nablus, Abeer spent her early years in Jordan due to the outbreak of the 1967 war. After the fall of the West Bank, many of the homes in the surrounding villages were visited by Israeli soldiers, who were informed that they had one hour to gather their belongings and leave. Though she was quite young at the time, Abeer recalls “feeling a sadness that we were leaving our home.”
Life in Jordan offered more opportunity for many Palestinians, who fled the West Bank by the thousands. It was here that Abeer spent most of her childhood and had access to good schooling, which was considered mandatory by her father, who was himself a schoolteacher. It was he who constantly told her that “the most important thing in life is that you learn something new every day.”
Some eleven years later, Abeer felt it necessary to return to her village. She recalls being very disappointed in what it had become of it, realizing “there was nothing there for me, or anyone.” No electricity, no water, and, needless to say, very little opportunity could be found. Subsequently, she decided it was best to continue with her studies, and opted to obtain her B.A. in psychology from Najah University in Nablus.
Soon thereafter, an incident in the Gaza Strip sparked a massive flare up in what was to become the first intifadah. The mass uprising against the Israeli military occupation left more than two thousand dead, and even more wounded and arrested. The conflict paralyzed life in the West Bank, as schools closed and all freedom of movement was restricted.
One day, Abeer heard a knock on the door where an Israeli soldier waited to inform her that his unit had been ordered to take residence on the roof of her home for surveillance of Nablus. For three years, two dozen soldiers resided there, often entering her home to use the bathroom, shower, and get food.
It was during this period that Abeer recalls sitting with her husband, Rimah, and realizing that it was unfortunate that the only source of information available to Palestinians was through satellite television channels, primarily out of Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Recognizing the great need for local television, and with the help and support of Rimah, Gama TV was born. Operating out of their bedroom, the two began putting together programs that were made for and by the community of Nablus, freely discussing the most pertinent issues that affected them.
Though the subsequent years saw the continued success of Gama TV, there are several obstacles that continually challenge the station. On May 22nd, 2007, the Israeli Defense Forces, operating on unsubstantiated evidence that Abeer was running a Hamas-funded television station, raided Gama TV and confiscated a majority of the production equipment and computers. Though the claim was never confirmed, and the station has cleared US government background checks, the equipment has not been returned to this day. Abeer remembers the first time she saw the wreckage in the station. “I felt like I lost a part of myself”, she recalls.
When asked how she is able to continue running a television station under the circumstances that the occupation has produced, Abeer stated that it is imperative to be both strong and flexible. Every evening, when compiling a list of the following day’s activities and meetings she creates an additional list-‘Plan B’ in case clashes, curfews, or checkpoints force her to alter her schedule.
Abeer extends her gratitude to the Internews Network Aswatona project, noting that its support has “eased some of the difficulties of what happened in the raid” and “has added to the station’s ability to operate professionally and produce quality television.”
When asked about her inspiration, what drives her to wakeup early every morning to be a wife, a mother, an NGO coordinator, a Network President, and the director of a TV station, Abeer responded, “It is my husband. And the idea that through the station’s programs I can hope that we can all continue learning something new every day.”

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Obama Wants TV Doctor for Surgeon General
The nation’s most famous TV surgeon, Sanjay Gupta, is the president-elect’s top choice for U.S. surgeon general, and he has said he wants the job as the federal government’s main spokesman on public health issues, The Washington Post reports.
Gupta, a practicing neurosurgeon who also serves as medical correspondent and host for CNN and contributor to CBS, was selected for his broadcasting skills as well as his medical credentials, suggesting that Obama wants a visible advisor and experienced communicator for the job, the Post’s Ceci Connolly and Howard Kurtz report. The 39-year-old physician would face confirmation by the Senate. (See Kurtz’s“Media Notes” column.)
According to The New York Times, Gupta, who “presides over a small media empire” that also includes columns in TIME magazine, is paid for speaking engagements, a controversial practice for journalists. CNN has stated that Gupta is currently reporting on health and wellness matters and not on matters involving the new administration. Meanwhile, TIME asks, "Is a TV Star Fit to Be Surgeon General?" but fails to quote anyone.

• By Dean Graber at 01/07/2009 - 10:40



(Source:Knight Challange)

Wednesday, January 7, 2009

Greetings to new elected Bangladeshi Prime Minister...





DHAKA (Reuters) – Sheikh Hasina, the winner of Bangladesh's parliamentary election last month, was sworn in as the country's prime minister on Tuesday, ending two years of rule by an army-backed interim government.
It will be her second time in the office.
President Iajuddin Ahmed administered the oath of office to Hasina, 61, and her new ministers at a ceremony at the presidential palace, attended by political leaders, high civil and military officials, diplomats and other dignitaries.
Hasina's Awami League and its allies won more than two-thirds of parliament's 300 seats in the December 29 election, with just 31 going to her bitter rival Begum Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its Islamist ally Jamaat-e-Islami.
Hasina and Khaleda had alternated in power for 15 years ending in 2006, with Khaleda winning two five-year terms and Hasina one.
The period was marked by frequent street protests, strikes and violence as whichever party was in opposition resorted to confrontational politics. The interim government took over amidst violence in January 2007, canceling an election due that month.
Since her victory Hasina has said she hopes for cooperation from all quarters, including the opposition.
Many Bangladeshis as well as foreign friends of the country hope her government will be stable enough to bring foreign investment and aid, and tackle the many serious problems facing the impoverished country of more than 140 million people.
Khaleda sent a team of her BNP's newly elected legislators to attend Hasina's swearing in, although they themselves have not yet taken their oath from the speaker of parliament.
They will do so in a couple of days, BNP officials said on Tuesday.
Hasina picked her ministers from all parties in her electoral "grand alliance" and will announce their portfolios later on Tuesday or on Wednesday, officials said.
In the Bangladesh system ministers can be named and sworn in ahead of the announcement of their specific portfolios. Only two of Hasina's are familiar faces, while the rest are newcomers, in line with her commitment for change, party workers say.
(Reporting by Anis Ahmed; Editing by Jerry Norton)


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6 - 01 - 2009


One of the most accredited interpretations offered to explain the launching of missiles by Hamas and the disproportionate Israeli reaction is that both in Israel and Palestine a general election is shortly to be held. While the holding of Palestinian elections is always, like the distribution of water, food, medicines and fuel, highly uncertain, the mandate of the President in office of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, expires on 9 January. Looming over the Palestinians is the risk of a resumption of the civil war between Al Fatah and Hamas, and an electoral competition could avert the resumption of hostilities.
Daniele Archibugi is Professor of Innovation, Governance and Public Policy at the University of London, Birkbeck College and is the author of The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton University Press)
What is instead certain is the date of the Israeli election: it will be held on 10 February 2009 and in view of the fragmented political system in the country it would seem that no single party will succeed in winning enough votes to govern the country by itself. Two of the three candidates are playing key roles in today’s conflict: the Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, leader of the Kadima Party, and the Defence Minister Ehud Barak, leader of the Labour Party. The third candidate, the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, currently in opposition, was leading in the polls before hostilities began, perhaps because he is considered a hawk in general and because he resigned as Foreign Minister when Israel began its withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 more specifically. And it is precisely the attempt by Livni and Barak to regain votes and to hinder Netanyahu’s progress that explains the savageness of the Israeli reaction. According to a handful of opinion polls held at the end of December, a significant number of voters are changing their mind.
We are all democratic and bless the moment in which people express their will, particularly when a crisis looms. Vox populi vox dei: elections serve the purpose of confirming old leaders who have proved themselves capable of governing properly or else of voting them out of office in the hope that the newly elected will do better than the old ones. And, more importantly, elections are a form of political agonising which is based on non-violence. However, these conventional predictions of democratic theory are not valid in Israel and in Palestine. This leads to the paradox that the imminent elections are likely to bring war and violence. Why?
When politics gives way to proclamations
As far as the Palestinian people is concerned, years and years of hardship, the lack of any hope of having a future worth living, have reinforced a leadership - that of Hamas - capable of pronouncing high-sounding slogans but quite uninterested in offering a political solution to the conflict with Israel. Never before in contemporary politics has there been such a clear-cut disproportion between the declared objectives and political reality. Hamas denies the right of the State of Israel to exist but completely lacks any credible military deterrent power. How is it, then that the Palestinian people, when allowed to express themselves by voting, as in the last legislative election held in 25 January 2006, actually gave Hamas the relative majority? While more realistic political forces such as Al Fatah have succeeded in wresting only paltry concessions from Israel in dozens of half-baked negotiations, the people have consigned themselves into the hands of the political force that speaks with the loudest voice.
To speak loudly, indeed, and achieve no results. It is sufficient to read Hamas’ decision not to renew the six-monthly truce with Israel brokered by Egypt and which expired on 18 December. For ten days Hamas added to its rhetoric the launching of some sixty or so Kassam rockets. From the military standpoint this missile has proved ineffective, causing the death of one Israeli citizen before the beginning of the reprisals on 27 December and a few after that date. From the political point of view, Hamas has handed on a plate to the Israeli government a perfect excuse for a new and wholly disproportionate reprisal .
Apart from any ethical consideration, Hamas has acted irresponsibly as it triggered an escalation it is unable to maintain. However, this launching of rockets must not be judged by the yardstick of foreign policy, but by that of the internal micro-politics of the lacerated Palestinian political community. Hamas is fully aware that by forcing Israel into responding militarily it will gain increased consensus not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank and among the population of the Palestinian diaspora. It thus sets itself up as the victim of the conflict, shows that nothing good can come out of negotiations and discredits the negotiations engaged in by the Palestinian National Authority. At the same time, the yet to be sworn-in President elect of the United States will have a much harder task to mediate an agreement. The harsher the Israeli reaction, the more politically victorious Hamas will appear on the domestic front, obtaining a consensus that it can cash in on also when free elections among the Palestinians are held.
The priority of domestic politics
However, the cynical unscrupulousness of Hamas alone would not be enough to bring about a crisis of these proportions. It takes two to have a fight. What interest could Israel thus have had to respond to a salvo of rockets with a crushing aerial bombardment condemned by the whole world? Why did it not realize that by so doing it would simply be strengthening the position of the worst Palestinian factions? Everyone knows what Hamas’ intentions are, beginning with the sophisticated political experts in the Israeli government. Apart from the moral considerations regarding the killing of hundreds of civilians, the Israeli government did not realize that this reprisal has made its own population even more insecure, exposing it to the risk of a new season of suicide attacks? Also in this case, the Israeli response has very little to do with foreign policy. It has instead a lot to do with the 10 February election, in which each leader will have to prove he or she is the toughest against their enemies. The effect is that, instead of having a moderating effect on each other, they have been incited to prove to their electors that they would each be capable of destroying the external threat. And, according to recent opinion polls, it seems that a significant number of Israelis have changed their intentions and are now willing to support again the political parties of Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak.
Peace and democracy
Over the past twenty years, international political observers have discussed at length the theory of peace among democracies. According to this hypothesis it is highly unlikely that two democratic countries will wage war on each other. The conclusion is that a democratic regime acts as a kind of vaccine against war, at least when waged against other equally democratic regimes. Even though Israelis and Palestinians have quite different political regimes (a consolidated democratic system in the first case, an uncertain representative system in the second, also as a result of the absence of an actual state), this would seem to be a case that disproves the theory: the approach of the elections increases the likelihood of violence.
But if those in power can so easily manipulate public opinion and, instead of being punished by the voters, are actually rewarded, it raises some doubts as to the truth of vox populi vox dei. What is the remedy? Many courageous proposals have been put forward in forty years of conflict, by both Israelis and Palestinians. These proposals have all been ignored by the leaders and, at least in the case of Israel, by leaders elected by the people.
A film as a message of peace
In these days we need to pay extra attention to the few wise words that emerge from the belligerents. One of them comes from a recent Israeli film, Waltz with Bashir. As observed by the New York Times, this is a cartoon and a documentary, a film of political propaganda and a study of memory. It is of course based on a true story, that of the director Ali Folman, a young Israel soldier who took part in the occupation of Lebanon in 1982 where he received his baptism of fire. Having lost his memory, Folman searches for his vanished recollections by interviewing his old comrades in arms a quarter of a century later.
Although the images consist of cartoon figures, the soundtrack makes use of the real voices of those who witnessed this war and this unique combination would be enough to justify giving a film genre such a contradictory name – a “cartoon–documentary”. However the film is above all a historical and political document as this is one of the first times that an Israeli artist engages in introspection, not to reconstruct the Holocaust tragedies, but one of the many conflicts with its Arab neighbours. The episode which triggers his trauma is the fact that Israeli soldiers stood by idly, and possibly were complicit, while about three thousand Palestinians were murdered by the Lebanese falangist militants in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. A trauma, in other words, that stems from not being victims but being the assassins’ accomplices. The film enjoyed success at Cannes, London, New York and above all in Israel. The audience was able to appreciate an important message, that of grief linked not only to the violence suffered but also the violence perpetrated.
Today the Israeli army is ready to invade the Gaza strip again. Once again, young soldiers are sent to kill and, if expectations based on the relative military strength of the two sides are confirmed, occasionally also to be killed. They will first of all destroy lives and hopes of peoples living in one of the most deprived areas of the world. But they will also come back to their homes with the trauma of having committed carnage. How is it that as many as 80 per cent of Israelis approve the actions of their government? It will take much more than a film to explain it. Any sensible witness in any other part of the world would seriously doubt that vox populi vox dei.
(Source:Open Democracy)


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, January 06, 2009
Today's headlines:
• All the news fit to print. (And a page 1 advert)

• Private TV station attacked in Sri Lanka: police

• Netherlands: Radio Netherlands Worldwide partnership with NRC Handelsblad

• Fewer reporters died in 2008; Iraq still deadliest

• US: Online video viewing jumps 34 percent

• Wikipedia campaign surpasses USD 6 million goal



All the news fit to print. (And a page 1 advert)
Loyal readers of the New York Times were left spluttering into their coffee cups Monday morning when their beloved paper was encroached upon by a controversial innovation: front-page advertising.� The decision to strip a display advert for CBS television across all six columns at the bottom of the front page is the latest move by the paper to find ways out of the financial crisis. The move brings it into line with other US papers which have succumbed to commercial imperatives and broken with the tradition of editorial-only front pages. The Wall Street Journal started taking page one adverts in July 2006. But the argument that it is falling in line will not assuage traditional readers, who have long looked to the front page of the New York Times as a bastion of editorial standards in an increasingly commercial world. While the page, with its multiple stories turning to inside sections, is often criticised for poor design, it is equally often held up as a model of editorial excellence. In a statement, the paper said it would only place adverts on the lower half of the page - 'below the fold' in print parlance. The New York Times's motto, 'All the news that's fit to print', continues to appear on the front page. (The Guardian)
Private TV station attacked in Sri Lanka: police
Attackers torched a private TV station in Sri Lanka Tuesday after it was labelled 'unpatriotic' for its coverage of the war against Tamil rebels, police and media activists said. The studios and control room of the Maharaja TV network just outside Colombo were smashed and set alight in a pre-dawn attack, police said. Media rights activists said the station had been accused by sections of the state media of 'unpatriotic' coverage and criticised for reporting a suicide bombing in Colombo on Friday, the day troops took the rebel political capital of Kilinochchi. Media rights activist Poddala Jayantha said the attack followed hate speech spread by a section of the state media. An MTV spokesman said men in a van without number plates had carried out the attack, which came two days after the station was hit with a petrol bomb. There were no casualties, but the station was severely damaged. Journalists, newspapers and even newspaper delivery boys in Sri Lanka have come under attack as part of the bitter ethnic war between Tamil Tiger rebels and Sri Lankan security forces. Several journalists - some Tamils and others from the majority Sinhalese community - have been killed, but no one has been held responsible despite government promises to investigate.� (AFP)
Netherlands: Radio Netherlands Worldwide partnership with NRC Handelsblad
Radio Netherlands Worldwide has launched a partnership with the international website of the Dutch national daily, NRC Handelsblad. Under the arrangement, the two sites exchange Dutch-related news and current affairs articles via RSS feeds. In addition, they'll publish a selection of background stories and commentary articles on their respective home pages. The collaboration aims to widen the journalistic output on both sites, which cater for a non-Dutch-speaking audience. NRC Handelsblad's international collaboration includes partnerships with key European media organisations, including Der Spiegel in Germany. Radio Netherlands Worldwide exchanges content with Expatica.com, reaching expats inside the Netherlands as well as abroad. RNW's partnership with NRC Handelsblad starts with a three-month trial period, after which a decision will be made on its final make-up.(Radio Netherlands)
Fewer reporters died in 2008; Iraq still deadliest
The Committee to Protect Journalists says Iraq remains the most lethal place for working media members despite a two-thirds decline in deaths there in 2008. The New York-based private group said Monday that 11 journalists were killed there last year compared with 32 in each of the two years before that. All 11 were locals working for Iraqi news outlets. Worldwide there were 41 work-related journalist deaths in 2008, a sharp drop from 65 killed the year before. The committee says journalists credit Iraq's lower death toll to 'improvement in security conditions.'� (AP)
US: Online video viewing jumps 34 percent
Americans appear to be getting more comfortable watching videos online - and Google is the clear winner. Internet users in the U.S. watched 12.7 billion online videos in November, an increase of 34 percent versus a year ago, according to numbers released Monday by market researcher ComScore.� Thanks to YouTube, Google Sites retained the crown as the top U.S. video property with nearly 5.1 billion videos viewed - or about 40 percent of all videos viewed online - with the video-sharing site accounting for more than 98 percent of Google's traffic. Fox Interactive Media was a distant second with 439 million videos watched (or 3.5 percent), followed by Viacom Digital with 325 million videos watched (2.6 percent). The data also showed that 77 percent of all U.S. Internet users had viewed online videos in 2008, and that the average online video viewer watched 273 minutes of video.(CNET News)
Wikipedia campaign surpasses USD 6 million goal
The Wikimedia Foundation has achieved its goal of raising over USD 6m to sustain Wikipedia. As of Jan. 2, the campaign had generated just over USD 6.2m from 125,000 donors from around the world. The San Francisco-based company said funds will be used to maintain and grow the Foundation's technical infrastructure, which includes managing global traffic for Wikipedia. A personal appeal from founder Jimmy Wales, published on the Wikimedia Foundation's website on Dec. 23, 2008, resulted in a surge of more than 50,000 contributions in eight days, totaling USD 2m and closing the gap towards the revenue goal. (Media Post)
EJC announces Blogging Competition 2009
The European Journalism Centre (EJC) is launching The European Blogging Competition 2009, on the theme of TH!NK ABOUT IT.
The focus of the competition is the European Parliament Elections 2009. EJC wants to offer a platform for journalism students, aspiring journalists and bloggers to express their views on European topics as well as to report and cover the elections.

EJC invites interested bloggers to visit www.thinkaboutit.eu information site to learn more and sign up.
Registered participants get a free trip to Brussels to the TH!NK ABOUT IT. kick-off event 25.-27.1.2009. At the end of the Competition, June 2009, participants receive a work certificate for doing journalistic work for a European online publication (January-June 2009). Best blog posts are awarded with nice prizes.
Please contact info@thinkaboutit.eu, if you have questions about the Competition, or want to recommend an accomplished blogger to take part in the event.
Conferences & Seminars
The European Journalism Centre is organising a series of information briefings for journalists on various EU policy areas in 2008:
• Common Foreign and Security Policy
• Economical and Financial Policy
• EU External Co-operation in Action
• European Neighbourhood Policy
For more information and to apply online, please visit http://www.ejcseminars.eu

(Source:EJC)

Monday, January 5, 2009

The "new violence" of Mumbai/Next:Russian Crisis


The recent terrorist attack in Mumbai is not a continuation of politics by other means, but part of an exclusivist, modern project that sees human freedom as superfluous.

The attacks in Mumbai have once again reminded us in the starkest terms about the ugly and horrifying face of global terror. Though India is no stranger to violence, the atrocity in Mumbai was not some spontaneous volcanic outburst of India's supposedly ancient communal strife, or part of a "violent conspiracy" to deny India's rising power

(Photo submitted concerned with next below article)

status in the world. It was a calculated act of violence aimed at the idea of Indian democracy and at human freedom in general.

In contrast to the brutality of conventional wars and of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, the violence of terrorism is epochal, carnivalesque, and deeply anti-political. It derives its psychotic energy and appeal from the spectacle of "breaking news", delivered minute-by-minute by internet and television media. Spectacle releases terrorism from the shackles of invisibility and inaudibility.

It would be a grave mistake to think that modern terror represents the violence of "the wretched of the earth". Unlike the socio-economic violence of rebellious peasants or the "working classes", the new violence does not like soiling its feet in the mud and slush of rice fields or in the dirty factories in the poorer parts of the world. In fact, the essence of global terror lies in the sanitization and de-politicization of violence, making it "picture perfect" for public consumption. Dr. Ashwani Kumar teaches Politics at Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at Centre of Global Governance at LSE (London) and one of the Chief-Editors of LSE Year book on Global Civil Society 2009

Such terrorism is fuelled by the twin processes of associational revolution (the boom, for example, of Islamist organizations, including educational and fundraising bodies) and information revolution. It also taps into that very modern paranoia - what the Polish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman terms "liquid fear" - of amorphous peril. It is in this sense that India has ultimately, willingly or unwillingly, joined the unfolding march of that universal journey called "9/11". Mumbai's so-called "26/11" has been tragically inserted into that "shared archive of a supposedly universal calendar" as described by the late Jacques Derrida.

In contrast to the centrally-organized, bureaucratically-managed, "legitimate" secular violence of the nation-state, the new violence is deeply engrained in the globalized a-moral war against each other. The violence of the old wars of the nation-states was organized through the standing army and maintained by the extensive system of public revenue. Old violence also had many forms of fundamentally "public" eruptions such as mob violence, street violence, ethnic riots and so forth. In stark contrast, new violence mutates in secret. The entrepreneurs of new violence live perpetually in the private space as they cannot be brainwashed, trained and taught fidayeenand the idea of the "multitude" of the public space. methods in the public sphere. The anxieties and dilemmas of perpetually living in a private sphere constituted by deeply hierarchical, masculine and gendered power relations force these terrorists to seek revenge against the fact

Arising from the tragic "breakdown of communicative rationality", the new violence has brutally reminded us about the hidden depths beneath the public sphere and the vulnerabilities of open societies. It has been largely financed by private sources and perpetrated by irregular entrepreneurs without any fixed military uniform. In Mumbai, clean-shaven entrepreneurs of violence discarded their traditional outfits and wore modern cargo pants and t-shirts emblazoned with "Versace". The outrage they perpetrated is not a typical Clausewitzean case of the "continuation of politics by other means." It is fundamentally anti-political and essentially nihilistic as it speaks only of grievances, identities, and virtues without any reference to human beings as constituted by their real social relations and individuals rights.

There is some over-arching tactical order to the chaotic universe of terrorist violence; Mumbai comes after recent attacks in Delhi, Ahmadabad, Jaipur and elsewhere within India. The strategy is clear; the new violence does not want to remain anonymous anymore. Now it wishes to be serialized in the interstices of local and global. It elevates violence to the "sexy, seductive" pleasure of grand spectacle. More importantly, by choosing to attack hotels, railways stations, busy streets, hospitals, and restaurants, terrorists have decided to suffocate free, open public spaces where people act in concert with each other as sweating, suffering, breathing, and smiling creatures. What happened in Mumbai is thus part of the global march of an extremely exclusivist, violent and modern project that sees human beings as superfluous and human freedom as irrelevant. Democracy, especially one as vast and complex as India's, cannot afford more zones of closure as these will suffocate its intrinsic capacity to resolve the dilemmas of maintaining an open society.

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Russia’s crisis: the political options:

It is by no means a proven fact that economic crises weaken authoritarian regimes. Statistical analyses have shown that, however deep or prolonged these crises may be, the regime's duration in office is unaffected. Some authoritarian regimes are able to emerge from a crisis without major losses (Mexico in 1982), while others are swept away by protesting citizens (Indonesia in 1998).

The balance of supply and demand in any market is affected by economic crises: in the political market there is a drastic change in the balance of political advantage. During crises citizens may (1) prefer to preserve the existing regime and support the status quo ("loyalty"), (2) passively adapt to the changing situation ("exit") or (3) actively speak out against the policy of the ruling regime, or against the regime as such ("voice"). Many variables affect the choice of behavioural strategy, both at an individual and mass level. These include demand for changes in the status quo, but also what is in offer from the ruling regime and from its opponents too. It is, therefore, not surprising that even popular dissatisfaction with the regime does not always result in mass protests.

Russia is no exception to the general rule. In the post-Soviet period, by international standards there was a very low level of social and economic protest, considering the scale and duration of the recession accompanying transformation during the 1990's. As market reform got under way in Russia there were many predictions of protests occasioned by the wave of dissatisfaction when prices were liberalised. However, mass dissatisfaction throughout the whole of this period did not turn into a mass protest. In 1997-1998 surveys by VTSIOM (the All-Russian Centre for Study of Public Opinion) recorded that approximately 25-30% of Russian citizens were ready to take part in protests; the actual percentage was considerably lower. This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that social and economic protest in Russia depended not so much on the demand for alternatives to the existing status quo, as on what is on offer in the political market.

Little opposition or protest

Alternatives in post-Soviet Russia were few and far between. Unlike the countries of Latin America, post-Communist countries did not have the preconditions necessary to create strong trade unions capable of mobilising the masses. In Russia they are still not there. What exceptions there are only prove the rule.

The largest opposition party of Russia - the Communist Party - had considerable support in the 1990s, but for a number of reasons it proved incapable of converting this into anti-regime protest. After its defeat at the presidential elections in 1996, the Party rejected once and for all the mobilisation of the masses, going as far as to proclaim the slogan "infiltration into power". Other parties and movements were even less capable of heading mass demonstrations.

Furthermore, in the 1990s the potential role of protest was diminished still further by the spontaneous decentralisation of the Russian state. Delayed payments of wages and pensions were found to be the fault of both the federal centre and the regional governors, so it was not so obvious at which of the potential "targets" the protest should be aimed. The federal and regional authorities in their turn not only shifted responsibility on to each other, but also used the protest for their own ends. In many instances mass demonstrations were actually organised or sponsored by the managers of enterprises or by regional and local authorities, as a way of putting pressure on the federal authorities. American researcher Graeme Robertson has shown that the more severe the conflict between the heads of executive power in the regions and the Federal centre at the end of the 1990s, the more serious the strikes in these regions.

After 2000 the recession was replaced by swift growth in the Russian economy and the reasons for mass social and economic protest seemed to have disappeared. Yet the beginning of 2005 saw the largest mass protests in post-Soviet Russia, triggered by authorities unsuccessful attempt at replacing pensioners' social benefits with cash payments. However, this did not create any serious challenge to the regime either. On the one hand, the protest "target" proved to be divided, as responsibility for social reforms was split between the federal and regional authorities. On the other hand, none of the opposition forces was capable of converting mass dissatisfaction into coordinated demonstrations on a nationwide scale. As a result, the protest ran out of steam and gradually trickled away.

At this time something similar occurred with other protests by public movements. Unconnected protests against urban redevelopment and housing reforms, in defence of the rights of car owners, small businesses etc. remained a local phenomenon. They did not affect the policy of the regime, and the coordination of these movements in different regions was sporadic. Therefore it is no exaggeration to say that there have not yet been any truly significant manifestations of social and economic protest in the post-Soviet history of Russia.

Strategies for dealing with protest

What can the authorities do about the protests? They have two strategies to choose from. They can opt for repression, and stop at nothing to prevent the goals of protest being achieved. Or they can choose conciliation, allowing the protestors to achieve part of their goal and even possibly co-opt them into the ranks of the regime's "fellow-travellers", while retaining control of the situation.

In the 1990s the federal authorities had almost no resources for repression: the forces needed for suppressing protest were limited and the costs could prove prohibitive. So the centre opted for conciliation, agreeing to negotiations and individual concessions. For instance, at the time of the "rail war" during the miners' strikes of 1998 they attempted to prevent protest from spreading nationwide and kept it local. The federal authorities reacted similarly to the unexpected protests at proposed social benefits reform. They managed to buy off the pensioners and veterans who took to the streets, and a small percentage of the representatives of social groups, which could potentially have become the core of a fresh protest, were allowed into the establishment via the Public Chamber and other channels.

However, the strategy of repression was consistently used to deal with the threat of political protest, which worried the regime far more, especially after the "coloured revolutions" of 2003-05. Organisations capable of challenging the regime (parties, nonprofit organizations, the media) were subject to attacks from the authorities (the dispersal of the "marches of dissent" being the best known example). Preventive measures to restrict the scope of their activities set the barriers very high for collective action on the part of real or potential opposition.

At the same time, the iron hand of the ruling group combined with other factors to allow the Russian regime to create an extremely unfavourable environment for social and economic protest. Chief among these was the fact that the elite was united and that the opportunities were minimal of being able to convert any alternative agenda into a decision-making system. It was with these unfavourable conditions and almost no experience of protest that Russia arrived at the beginning of the economic crisis.

At present, although surveys by the Public Opinion Foundation, Levada Center and other services record a growth in mass dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the country, there is still a high level of support for the regime and its leaders. Russian citizens remain loyal to the status quo (as has been the case so far, throughout the 2000s).

However, we should not forget that popular support for authoritarian regimes like Russia's is not diffuse, but quite specific. In other words, citizens support the regime not because they like it as such, but because for the majority it brings material dividends (or at least the hope of such dividends). Popular support for these regimes is rather like a relationship with a prostitute: she is prepared to make love as long as she is paid money, but when the client's money runs out (in this case, the money of the ruling group of the authoritarian regime), her love is no longer for sale. So, if the recession in Russia will be, as many economists predict, deep and prolonged, it will be quite difficult for the Russian regime to keep its citizens' loyalty and there will inevitably be increased demands for alternatives to the status quo. These demands are likely to be anti-modernisation ("bringing resource rents back") and based on slogans which are left-wing, or (in the worst case scenario) aggressively nationalistic. However, the selection of behavioural strategies ("exit" vs. "voice", passive adaptation vs. active resistance) will depend not only and not so much on demand, but also on what is available in the Russian political market.

Withdrawal v protest

If political opportunities in Russia remain unchanged, mass nationwide protest does not at this stage seem very likely. There are no nationwide organisations for mobilising the masses and no common "target" for protest. There are also no influential leaders who have deserted the ruling group and are capable of leading and channeling this protest (all of which was the case with a vengeance in the collapse of authoritarianism during the crises in the USSR in 1989-1991 or in Mexico in 1988-2000).

Given these circumstances, the option of "exit" as a reaction to the crisis would seem to be most likely for Russians. This could manifest itself in different forms, ranging from exit into a marginal way of life, exit into crime, up to leaving the country. But this will only happen if the regime makes the appropriate social and economic niches available. After all, Russia had similar experiences in Soviet times, as it did in the 1990s. In other words, Russians are used to "exit" . However, the problem is that the developing crisis makes such niches increasingly less accessible and/or less attractive. If "exit" is unattractive and/or inaccessible, Russians may simply be forced to "protest".

Paradoxically enough the conservative (reactive) strategy of restraint used by the Russian regime in the crisis might be another source of protest. The ruling group, which not unjustifiably considers protest a challenge to its supremacy, keeps a tight hand on even local protests e.g. in Vladivostok against increases in duties on imported cars. It reverts to preventive measures against potential enemies (such as tightening up the Criminal Code).

However, compared to other authoritarian regimes of the post-Soviet space, the Russian regime has a fairly low level of repressiveness and this could be the Achilles' heel of the strategy of repression. During the 2000s, the Russian regime carried out "pinpoint" repression of its opponents, which is both cost effective and targeted at maintaining the status quo.

The current Russian regime has no direct experience of mass repressions of its citizens. Therefore, if protest even at local level exceeds the technical limits of suppression by force (in other words, if so many protestors take to the streets that it will be impossible to disperse them without mass killings), then the repression of protest may prove to be too costly for the regime. This cannot be ruled out (it is unlikely that the ruling group will suffer from moral qualms). But the level of risk for the leadership of the country is very high. Furthermore, one should remember that repressive authoritarian regimes are most dangerous for representatives of elite and sub-elite groups - for them the risk of becoming victims of this type of regime is much higher than for ordinary citizens.

Conciliation?

At the same time, in conditions of crisis the Russian regime may change its strategy and revert to conciliation. If the economic and political situation in the country remains more or less under the control of the ruling group, then for an authoritarian regime with a (so far) low level of repression, a possible solution might be to expand its social and political base.

The least expensive and most effective method would be for the regime to co-opt potentially disloyal "fellow-travellers" from elites and sub-elite groups. Material support, even if only symbolic, from some of the social segments that are most important for the regime (above all the residents of large cities) would also be effective.

For the ruling group, the short term cost of dividing up the (already decreasing) revenues with new junior partners would be relatively small; the long-term benefits of splitting up any potential opposition and isolating disloyal enemies on the principle "divide and rule" are obvious. It may be successful when demands for political alternatives increase and there is a threat of increased disloyalty among "fellow-travellers".

The preventive measure of conciliation and co-opting may also include more significant proposals for the managed "top-down" liberalisation of the Russian political system. For the moment at least these would not touch the heart of the regime - the absolute monopoly of the ruling group in the decision-making process. Historical experience, however, shows that this strategy only widens the window of political opportunities for protest, and is generally ineffective from the point of view of the survival of authoritarian regimes: they are either forced to return to the previous status quo or they face the threat of collapse (as occurred in the USSR during the period of perestroika).

Revolution from above?

The Russian regime may consider an alternative: an active offensive strategy of repression, a kind of "revolution from above". A move to this strategy will become more likely if the ruling group begins to lose control of the economic and political situation: it could seem to them that even local protests will be too big for the regime either to buy off its opponents or to suppress them with physical force. In this case the authorities may attempt to control the situation by initiating "protest" as a way of letting off steam and channeling mass dissatisfaction towards previously selected "targets". The ruling group will thus be able to effect a partial change in the composition of the elites or even to carry out selective repressions against social groups, whose support for the regime is not too important but who are resented by many of their fellow citizens.

The first scenario of "bombard the headquarters" might be directed against officials who are not coping in the crisis (starting with Dmitry Medvedev), some of the "oligarchs" and bankers, who send capital abroad and/or into currency assets, some regional leaders, and even, possibly, the leaders of "United Russia".

In the second scenario a natural "target" might be immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus, or even ethnic minorities as a whole. The expected increase in xenophobia and extremism in this case will be constrained by the political and ethnic composition of the population of Russia and the existence of its ethnic republics, especially in the North Caucasus and in the Volga Region.

It is extremely difficult to predict the consequences of these very risky steps (depending on their duration and scale) at present. The success of an active offensive strategy of repressions may allow the regime to survive the crisis and even to strengthen the position of Putin, sacrificing a section of fellow citizens; however, in an extreme case, its failure could even lead to the territorial disintegration of the country.

Throughout the 2000s, the Russian regime, which relied among other things on loyalty from its citizens, built political and institutional barriers on the path of changes to the status quo, in order to prevent any internal political challenge to the dominance of the ruling group. The challenges thrown up by the economic crisis could provoke Russians to abandon their loyalty to the regime. For this reason the revision of the status quo at the level of both popular behaviour and the strategy of the regime is currently highly likely. A further deepening of the crisis may force Russian authoritarianism towards changes. It is only not clear whether these changes will be for the best for the country.

© Vladimir Gelman, 2008


(Source:Open Democracy)