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The rubble of the Islamabad hotel bombing leaves Pakistan with only one option: to escape from the Washington-Taliban vice that traps it, says Ayesha Siddiqa.
(This article was first published on 24 September 2008)
24 - 09 - 2008
In assessing the country's predicament at this critical juncture, three elements that often fail to get the attention they deserve need to be borne in mind: the role of Washington and the way it is perceived by Pakistanis; the distinction between the country's ostensible (or political) government and its real (or shadow) one; and the role of class and its changing dynamics in Pakistan's economy and society.
A disunited nation
When the newly elected president of Pakistani, Asif Ali Zardari, made his maiden speech before the joint session of parliament on 20 September 2008, many Pakistanis thought that the country would at last begin to stabilise. The 53-year-old widower of the Pakistan People's Party uncontested leader Benazir Bhutto - who was assassinated on 27 December 2007 - might carry with him a questionable reputation, but the support he received during the election process gave him at least the plausible appearance of a unifying figure. The feeling didn't last long. Within a few hours of the speech in which Zardari, successor to Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan's hot-seat, promised the nation he would fight terrorism and uphold the country's sovereignty - the Pakistani capital was struck by one of the most destructive urban terrorist attacks in the country's history.The bomb-blast outside the five-star, five-storey Marriott hotel - which was frequented by diplomats, foreigners and affluent Pakistanis - left also a huge crater as a mark of its scale (see Beena Sarwar, "The Marriott Bombing: ‘Pakistan's 9/11'?", Chowk, 22 September 2008). A matter of equal concern was that the terrorist attack had taken place a mile away from the presidential palace where the just-installed president was hosting a party for the top leadership of the country, including the military. The event, profoundly shocking and depressing in itself, also raises questions about Pakistan's ability to fight terrorism -and even its very future. The confidence of many Pakistanis has been shaken. People are nervous about Zardari's ability to fight the menace of terrorism and lead the country through the storm. But he is not the only target of criticism. Washington also is being widely blamed in Pakistan for launching military incursions into Pakistani territory a few days before the presidential vote was finalised (see Paul Rogers, "Pakistan: the new frontline", 18 September 2008). The bombing of 20 September thus has divided the nation at the very time it most needs unity in response to the terrorist threat. This disunity, if it continues, will make it even harder for the new civilian regime to continue the struggle to maintain and enlarge democracy in Pakistan.
The real and the shadow
The majority of the dead in the Islamabad blast were poor working-class people, among them the Marriott's private-security guards and hotel staff. The affluent and politically liberal element of Pakistani society that formed a large part of the hotel's clientele is also in a state of shock. Both sets of people are asking: how can the regime protect everyday citizens when it could not stop a dumper-truck packed with RDX and TNT from entering and targeting a high-security area?
Many diplomats - stunned especially by the death in the blast of the Czech ambassador Ivo Zdarek - are now thinking of relocating their families, and foreign missions have generally warned their staff and nationals to avoid hotels and public places. The government's bizarre explanation for the blast, meanwhile, shows it to have little confidence in the people. The interior minister Rehman Malik, who is seen as one of Zardari's favoured colleagues, tried to deflect claims that the target was the American marines staying in the hotel; on 22 September he declared that Pakistan's political leadership had planned to meet for dinner at the hotel, but that the security agencies had received a tip-off about a possible attack on the venue, and had acted quickly to avert this. The evidence proves otherwise. The owner of the hotel said that the government had made no such original booking. But the sequence of statements raises fresh questions about the veracity of Rehman Malik's claim, as well as more general concerns about why enough had not been done to protect a place that was home to many foreigners and had already been attacked. What is worse is that Zardari left the country for his trip to the United States hours after the blast. This made him even less credible in the eyes of the people, who would have appreciated had he postponed his trip as a gesture of support for the victims. At this stage the regime's public standing is an important issue because this alone will enable him to fight the terrorist menace (see "How to beat the terrorists?", Economist ,23 September 2008).
But with every passing day the division between the "political" government and the "invisible" government - which includes the military - seems to increase. While Zardari chose to follow his schedule of visitng the United States (viewed by many Pakistanis as the deeper source of the threat to Pakistan), the army chief Ashfaq Kayani flew to China (a country that enjoys greater confidence among Pakistani citizens). If the two segments of the government begin to pursue a divergent line, the problems of the country are bound to increase. As it is, the invisible government is doing far less than it should if it is to dismantle the terror outfits that it once nurtured to fight the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s and later in Kashmir. Among openDemocracy's many articles on Pakistan's politics and security:Ehsan Masood, "Pakistan: the army as the state" (12 April 2007)Anatol Lieven, "At the Red Mosque in Islamabad" (4 June 2007)Maruf Khwaja, "The war for Pakistan" (24 July 2007)Shaun Gregory, "Pakistan: farewell to democracy" (29 October 2007)Irfan Husain, ""Pervez Musharraf's desperate gamble" (5 November 2007)Maruf Khwaja, "Pakistan: dynasty vs democracy" (9 January 2008)Irfan Husain. "Pervez Musharraf: the commando who couldn't" (19 August 2008)Shaun Gregory, "Pakistan's political turmoil: Musharraf and beyond" (26 August 2008)Paul Rogers, "Pakistan: the new frontline" (18 September 2008)
There is a difference of opinion within the state regarding which is the larger at threat: domestic terrorism or the United States? A weak Zardari, or one whose reputation for probity and good judgment continues to be doubted, will find it increasingly difficult to control the military and make it follow his line. A close examination suggests that while the political government is more willing to seek American help, the military is more concerned about Washington's plan to encourage Indian influence in Afghanistan and strengthen New Delhi to Islamabad's disadvantage.
A third option
It is a matter of concern that the Islamabad attack, like those preceding it, has failed to generate any domestic consensus about the nature of the threat. Indeed, the situation is worse: for the Marriott bombing has further highlighted an emerging class as well as exposes an ideological divide within Pakistani society. Pakistan's middle class is far from exclusively composed of affluent, upwardly-mobile, western-educated liberals; many in this category are conservative, and some of them are even involved in funding both madrasas and jihad. Those involved in small or medium-sized businesses in the urban areas of Pakistan - especially the bazaaris or the trader-merchant class - often view orthodox forms of religion as a source of empowerment and a tool to renegotiate power in a stagnant, feudal social order. These people also form the constituency of the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and of Pervez Musharraf's former ally (who also briefly served as prime minister in 2004), Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. But very few observers see the class issue in this war. The Taliban have killed the maliks (who represented old power), while many neo-Taliban view themselves as challenging traditional power-structures. The Pakistani media is equally confused on the question, partly because many of the popular presenters and journalists themselves - like most of the middle class now - have a conservative leaning. Things become even more complex in the lack of understanding of the need to reform the education system, including the madrasas. The international aid agencies and governments must shoulder the responsibility for skewed thinking here. The present-day seminaries are different from what such schools were like in the past. Today, they produce ideological zealots who are more likely to be reinforced in their beliefs than re-educated by the sort of madrasa reform projects sponsored by the United States's Usaid and Britain's department for international development (DfID).
The present crisis is far more serious than any Pakistan has ever experienced (see Shaun Gregory, "Pakistan's political turmoil: Musharraf and beyond", 27 August 2008). Islamabad does not have the choice of supporting either the United States or the Taliban. The government ought to try to build a broad social consensus, in part by encouraging its partners - such as Maulana Fazlur-Rehman, leader of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Islamic Party of Religious Leaders / JUI) - to persuade low-ranking mullahs to condemn attacks such as that on the Marriott.
This effort to create a domestic coalition that can address such acts of terror should be part of a larger agenda to reach out to the rest of the world - including Russia, Iran, China, India and others - to keep the Americans at bay. Pakistan needs to go multilateral. Unless a third option is found beyond Washington and the Taliban, Pakistan will continue to burn - until it consumes itself.
(Courtesey:Open Democracy)
Nato, the west and Russia: from peril to progress
The attempt to make Georgia and Ukraine members of the Nato alliance is a flawed policy that guarantees further dangerous conflict with Russia. There is a better way, says Aviel Roshwald.
23 - 09 - 2008
The phenomenon of "imperial overstretch" was defined and analysed by the Yale historian Paul Kennedy in his acclaimed study The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987). In the closing section of this hefty volume - the part that gained most attention among scholars and the media - Kennedy extended his historical paradigm to the contemporary scene and suggested that the United States might well be on the verge of falling into the same self-defeating pattern of global overextension that had been the downfall of its great-power predecessors.Twenty-one years later, as Washington and other leading states of the Nato alliance press ahead with their plans for further Nato expansion, Kennedy's prescient warning remains unheeded. The consequences are fraught with peril for Nato, Russia, and the world. Aviel Roshwald is professor of history at Georgetown University. Among his books is The Endurance of Nationalism: Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
A provocative processMany people in the west argue that in the post-cold-war era Nato is no longer an anti-Russian alliance; and that Russian opposition to Nato expansion is a function of paranoid and anachronistic thinking, a throwback to a 19th-century conception of geopolitics that has no relevance in an age of "globalised" this and "transnational" that. This attitude reflects a lack of historical perspective and an inability to recognise the central importance of rank, status, and honour as factors in international relations. The more the west ignores or disrespects the Russians, the more this attitude aggrieves them; and the more aggrieved they are, the less open to geopolitical compromise they will prove. In what is still a dangerous nuclear age, an inability on Washington's and Moscow's part to reach a workable modus vivendi in Europe may prove calamitous to all parties.Nato arose as a response to the Soviet threat, and it was the confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact that shaped Nato's evolution and defined its identity as a political and military alliance. In the wake of its adversary's collapse, it has expanded ever further eastwards - incorporating along the way former Soviet satellites in east-central Europe, as well as the three Baltic states that had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in the early stages of the second world war.As this process unfolded, there was little serious talk of ever including a post-communist Russia in Nato. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that Russian leaders came to the conclusion that Nato remained - true to its historic roots - primarily directed against them. From a Russian perspective, Mikhail Gorbachev's voluntary abandonment of the Soviet sphere of influence was being rewarded by a humiliating expansion of the American sphere of influence to the frontiers of the former USSR, and beyond; and that expansion was taking place in the framework of the very alliance that had been formed to contain the Soviet Union in the first place.Such concerns were reinforced when Nato's well-justified intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was followed by the less well-judged decision by major western countries (including leading Nato members) to recognise Kosovo independence in February 2008 - on the basis of a loose interpretation of a United Nations Security Council resolution and in the face of strident Russian opposition. It is true (as many commentators have argued) that the situation in Kosovo is not exactly parallel to that in South Ossetia, the trigger of the crisis involving Georgia, Russia and the west in August 2008. But such political disputes and controversies cannot be so neatly confined and separated from each other. The Russians could here invoke arguments of both geopolitics and principle to argue that what the west was doing was to deny the Russians a meaningful say in the Balkans, while continuing to seek political, economic, and military influence in the Transcaucasus and Ukraine.This policy was bound to provoke eventual resistance from Russia, regardless of who was in charge of its government. The reality, comfortable or not, is that the west cannot expect to affirm its right to an ever-expanding sphere of influence while denying the Russians' right to a sphere of influence of their own - all the while insisting that the very concept of spheres of influence is undemocratic and out of date. The west's actions belie its words, and it is operating according to a painfully obvious double-standard. No other great power - or great-power aspirant - can reasonably be expected to remain passive in the face of such conduct.Moreover, the agreement to use Poland and the Czech Republic as bases for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system feeds into Moscow's worst geo-strategic fears. The primary purpose of the venture may be to counter a potential Iranian threat, but the establishment of a tracking system in east-central Europe obviously creates opportunities for looking deep into Russian space as well. And it is only to be expected that the Russians will conjecture that the limited ABM system to be installed in Poland may represent the thin end of the wedge. Indeed, the decision to rush the negotiations with Poland to a rapid conclusion in the midst of the Georgian crisis served to reinforce Russian suspicions that the missile-defense system is directed against them.Also in openDemocracy on the Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 and its implications:Thomas de Waal, "South Ossetia: the avoidable tragedy" (11 August 2008)Donald Rayfield, "The Georgia-Russia conflict: lost territory, found nation" (13 August 2008)Neal Ascherson, "After the war: recognising reality in Abkhazia and Georgia" (15 August 2008)George Hewitt, "Abkhazia and South Ossetia: heart of conflict, key to solution" (18 August 2008)Ivan Krastev, "Russia and the Georgia war: the great-power trap" (19 August 2008)Ghia Nodia, "Russian war and Georgian democracy" (22 August 2008)Fred Halliday, "The miscalculation of small nations" (24 August 2008)Robert Parsons, "Russia after war: the political landscape" (26 August 2008)Mary Kaldor, "Sovereignty, status and the humanitarian perspective" (26 August 2008)Vicken Cheterian, "Georgia's forgotten legacy" (3 September 2008)Rein Müllerson, "The world after the Russia-Georgia war" (5 September 2008)Paul Gillespie, ""The European Union and Russia after Georgia" (10 September 2008)Krzysztof Bobinski, "Europe's post-war promise" (15 September 2008)Martin Shaw, "After the Georgia war: the challenge to citizen action" (16 September 2008)Plus: openDemocracy's Russia section reports, debates and blogs the Georgia war. A dangerous overstretchThe implication of the above is not at all to suggest that the Russian government is free of blame in the crisis provoked by the war over South Ossetia. In particular, Russia's de facto dictator Vladimir Putin has shown himself to be a cold-bloodedly Machiavellian operator who seems to take a certain sadistic pleasure in the carefully calibrated, yet unfailingly ruthless, deployment of the instruments of power. There can be little doubt that his ambition is to reconstitute as much as possible of the former Soviet Union into a Russian-dominated union or confederation of some sort.The problem is threefold. First, this ambition is (given geographical and energy-resource realities) in current circumstances more achievable than the west's goal of drawing Russia's neighbours into its alliance system.Second, Nato's relentless push eastwards has helped to consolidate Putin's domestic image as the strong-willed leader whose neo-KGB regime is alone capable of countering American hubris and restoring a humiliated Russia to its rightful place in the world.Third, and worst of all, the west's policies have established a perceived linkage between democratisation and the expansion of American hegemony. What the west should have been striving for is a decoupling of the two, by way of demonstrating that democracy truly reflects universal values. Instead, it has become associated with the expansion of a military alliance and the redirection of oil and natural-gas flows in the Transcaucasus, away from Russian-controlled pipelines.Nato has over several years appeared oblivious to Moscow's steady escalation of warning-signals. Putin's speech at the Munich security conference in February 2007 which rejected American unilateralism; the Russian air-force's resumption of the cold-war practice of buzzing American offshore military bases; the strong Russian hints at the time of Kosovo's declaration of independence that western support for the move would result in a quid pro quo in South Ossetia and Abkhazia - all these developments failed to register fully among the United States's (and other western governments') tone-deaf political decision-makers and advisors. Washington in particular, by closing off the possibility of meaningful compromises with Russia over such issues as the missile-defense system and Kosovo, has conveyed the impression that the only language it understands is that of force.Now, after Russia has in fact used force, Nato and the European Union cannot remain indifferent. Thus, it is important not to reward Moscow for its own resort to violent unilateralism (although it should also be recalled just how stupid and reckless was Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, in rising to Russia's bait by sending Georgian forces into South Ossetia, giving the Russians a pretext for their subsequent actions). The west should do what it can to shore up democratic governments and democratic processes in Georgia and Ukraine in the face of Russian efforts to subvert them.But to continue insisting on the eventual incorporation of these countries into Nato is folly. True, sovereign states like Georgia and Ukraine have every right to request admission to Nato. But Nato has no obligation to let them in. To admit Georgia would mean committing the alliance to the defence of a country whose borders are in dispute with Russia. Would it really be willing to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and risk escalation to a nuclear confrontation with Russia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia? And if not, where would that leave Nato's credibility?To let Ukraine join Nato would almost inevitably trigger a Moscow-orchestrated secession from Ukraine of the ethnically Russian Crimean peninsula, home to the Russian navy's Black Sea base. Does it serve anyone's interest to see another European state fall into fragments? Would the west be willing to place Nato's standing on the line over any ensuing border-conflict between a rump Ukraine and a Russian-controlled Crimea? Once again, if not, this would be to undermine the deterrent power of the alliance as a whole. To push Nato further east would be to overextend it. It would leave the alliance facing dilemmas far more painful and perilous even than those presented by the Georgian crisis.A creative challengeNato, and western powers in general, need to change course. The imminent presidential election in the United States offers an opportunity. What the next American president needs to do is to undertake a strategic review of relations with Russia, followed by intense, behind-the-scenes negotiations that must include Nato allies. The objective should be an overall accommodation with Russia based on realistic compromises that will be tough for both sides to accept, but necessary in order to avoid further dangerous confrontation.In any such talks, the missile-defense and Nato-expansion plans can actually serve as useful bargaining-chips. In exchange for establishing a definitive end to Nato enlargement and for cancelling or modifying the missile-defense system, the western allies should insist on much more energetic and consistent Russian cooperation in terminating Iran's suspected nuclear-weapons programme. They should also demand that Russia respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic institutions of its neighbours, with stronger mechanisms put into place for Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) oversight of electoral processes and the protection of human rights in its member-states.For its part, Russia can reasonably be expected to insist that former Soviet republics adhere to foreign policies that respect Moscow's fundamental security interests.
During the later years of the cold war, as the extreme perils of brinksmanship came to be fully appreciated by both sides, nuanced and subtle approaches to conflict resolution were developed that helped contain the risks of escalation. The flexible and imaginative diplomacy developed during the final decades of the cold-war era is sorely needed today.
With a fresh approach of this kind, there is every reason to believe that the west and Russia can yet create a framework for the negotiation of their differences and a basis for long-term stability across the European continent.
(Source:Knight Foundation)
Rediscovering Traditionalism
One year after re-introducing the Tridentine Mass and two years after the Regensburg address, Benedict XVI's popular new traditionalism has re-ignited the Catholic culture wars.
24 - 09 - 2008
Contents
· The new traditionalism
· The culture wars
· Not just talking to God in Latin
· Participation theology
· Traditionalists oppose Papal power
· Iconoclasm and novelty
· The Agatha Christie exception
· The authority to change
· Mass and Invariance
· Tradition re-discovered in every age
The new traditionalism
On 14th June this year about 1500 people filled Westminster Cathedral. Every seat was taken; people stood in the aisles and spilled out on to the piazza outside. The occasion was a mass, but not an ordinary mass. It was indeed a mass in what is now officially called the ``extraordinary form'' of the Roman rite, i.e. the mass as it had existed before the changes that followed the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). It was celebrated by Cardinal Castrillon Hoyos, and was the first mass in the traditional form to be celebrated in the Cathedral by a cardinal in thirty nine years.
openDemocracy's collection of material relating to Religion and Difference is here.John Casey is lecturer in English at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Gonville and Caius College. He writes and reviews frequently in newspapers and journals. Among his books are Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Clarendon Press, 1990)
Before the mass, Cardinal Castrillon had addressed the Latin Mass Society of England and Wales, a group which had striven for forty years to preserve the ancient liturgy. He told them to `take heart' because the new Pope sympathised with them, and he spoke of the `sacrifices' of those members of the Society `who have not lived to be here today.'
To outsiders, all this emotion, this talk of sacrifices made by dead Catholics for the liturgy might well be unintelligible. What are the great issues at stake? Why should people throng Westminster Cathedral and spill out onto the street, including many too young to remember the old ways, just to experience a service in Latin conducted by a prelate with his back to the people?
In July the Pope was in Australia for World Youth Day. About four hundred thousand of the young, who had travelled from all parts of the globe, acclaimed him at a vast open-air mass in Sydney. But the mass had some new-old features Latin (Gregorian) chant, an altar adorned in the old style with crucifix and seven candles, and an attempt at solemn reverence that is not usually seen at these mass liturgical events. Something is in the air.
The truth is that the Roman Catholic Church has been in crisis ever since the Second Vatican Council, a crisis not only of falling numbers attending mass, a reduction of vocations, the virtual extinction of some religious orders, but a crisis of identity of the Church itself. The confident, tightly centralised ``triumphalist'' Catholicism that followed the sixteenth century Council of Trent and regained many of the lands that had been lost to Protestantism, the Church that claimed to be `the one ark of salvation for all,' has been replaced by the ``pilgrim Church'', tentatively stretching out to other faiths, often apologetic about the past, sometimes ready to play down its most distinctive doctrines.
There is a deeper issue. Hilaire Belloc had said `Europe is the Faith, and the Faith is Europe.' Although Catholicism is a world-wide religion, and an Abrahamic faith, its European inheritance has been central, its philosophical theology deriving from Greece, its language and structures of authority from Rome. It was not for nothing that Hobbes described the papacy as `the ghost of the dead Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.' Enthusiasts for Vatican II thought they had changed all that. Rituals, language, even theology were to reflect the diverse cultures of the faithful, and even the subjective convictions of the individual.
The attempt since the Counter-reformation of the sixteenth century to resist some of the most important developments in modern culture, with an index of books forbidden to Catholics to read that included most of the greatest philosophers and imaginative writers of the modern world, was to be seen as a sort of auto-immune disorder -- an inability to cope with foreign bodies. In the light of this, an attachment to tradition seemed like a rejection of intelligence, and a scarcely defensible surrender to clerical dictatorship. The Church had raised the drawbridge against the modern world, and Vatican II would confidently lower it again. Central to that was the rejection of the traditional Latin mass. It was there that the battle lines were most obviously drawn.
The culture wars
Nearly twenty five years ago, a Pole was dining in my college in Cambridge. He told us that he had been an altar boy in Poland, and had often served the masses of the Archbishop of Cracow. A year or two after that prelate, Karol Woytila, had been installed in the See of Rome, he decided to visit him, for John Paul II never became too grand for his old Polish friends. The Pope (so he told the story) strode up to him, punched him lightly in the chest, and began: Introibo ad ad altare dei ... to which our guest responded: Ad deum qui laetificat iuventutum meum. (``I will go unto the altar of God'' ``To God who giveth joy to my youth.'') This was the opening exchange between priest and server of the old ``Tridentine'' Latin mass, abolished in the early1970s, and the two continued it right down to the Confiteor. Then the Pope shrugged his shoulders and said: `Well, that''s no use to us anymore.' His old altar boy replied: `No, Holy Father, and that''s why I no longer go to church.' To which the Pope (he said) instantly rejoined: `Don''t blame me. Blame that maniac John XXIII!'
Last September, a motu proprio (legislation of his own volition) of Pope Benedict XVI, liberating the old mass, and obliging parishes to provide it for those of the faithful who want it, came into effect. It was clearly an attempt to console those who were still attached to the old rite, including the followers of Archbishop Lefebvre, who rejected the new mass and many of the reforms of the Second Vatican Council (summoned by `that maniac, John XXIII.') ``Liberal'' Catholics grimly suspect that the Pope himself has long been disillusioned with the Council, and is bent on restoration of the old order. One Italian bishop said that he actually wept when he read the motu proprio, because he saw one of the greatest achievements of the modernists, a new style of liturgy, dissolving before his eyes. He was right to be alarmed. Benedict''s undoubted love of the old liturgy is also a love of the European culture which produced it.
On the other side, traditionalist Catholics, who were so joyously in evidence at Westminster cathedral, rejoiced mightily. Benedict XVI is on the way to becoming a hero as dear to them as Cyrus the Great was to the ancient Jews, because he freed them from the Babylonian captivity. When the motu proprio was issued, their websites triumphed in the imminent defeat of the philistines and were filled with accounts of celebratory champagne parties and suggestions that everyone should send flowers to the Pope in sign of gratitude.
Not just talking to God in Latin
But what is the fuss all about? Is this just a matter of some people preferring to talk to God in Latin? Or is it the re-igniting of a subterraneous culture war that has troubled the peace of the faithful over the past forty years?
First of all: it is not just a question of Latin. The ``Tridentine'' mass and the Latin mass are not one and the same thing. True, the Tridentine mass must be said in Latin in the Roman church. But decades ago you could attend Tridentine masses in High Anglican churches in Cornwall celebrated entirely in English. The new order of mass, promulgated by Pope Paul VI after the Second Vatican Council, was originally meant to be usually in Latin, but is nearly always said in the vernacular. But whatever the language, it is different from the old mass, in feel, liturgical gesture and some would even say in theology. The liturgy has always embodied both prayer and doctrine: it is both lex orandi and lex credendi. The ultras would argue that the changes in the mass were part of a stealthy attempt to alter doctrine. The great Council of Trent (1546-63) marked the final separation between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism with ferocious clarity. Catholic doctrines such as the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, reaffirmed by Trent, are liturgically enforced in the Tridentine mass with no possible ambiguity.
The ultras have a point. A pious Catholic who had fallen asleep in 1960 and woken up forty years later would be puzzled indeed at a modern mass (unless he had been allowed to slumber all those years in Brompton Oratory or a few other traditionalist redoubts.) He would find the modern Church culturally and psychologically so altered that he might be tempted to see it as a new religion masquerading under the old name. He might, like my Polish acquaintance, decide not to bother any more.
The first time I was taken to mass as a child, my mother told me to watch the altar attentively, because an angel might fly across it. My hope in seeing the angel faded quite soon, well before my faith did, but the feeling that the celebration of mass marked a mystery in which Godhead was truly present on the altar, body, blood, soul and divinity, under the appearances of bread and wine was astonishingly powerful. The form of the old mass enforced it. There was an overwhelming emphasis on the mass as an actual sacrifice, a mysterious re-enactment of Christ''s sacrifice on Mount Calvary. The priest began at the foot of the altar, with prayers that he might be worthy to ascend the steps: Introibo ad altare dei. In mounting the altar steps the priest was being brought ``unto thy holy mount, and into thy tabernacles.'' These are the words of psalms from the Hebrew Bible, and they go with an extraordinary insistence on using the language of ancient Jewish sacrifice -- `a holy victim, a pure and unblemished sacrifice.' (A Jewish friend of mine, attending a Tridentine mass for the first time, said that this language, and the elaborate cleansing of the sacred vessels, took his mind back to Temple Judaism.) The ritual proceeded with the inevitability of a piece of intricate and beautiful mechanism, as the priest mounted the steps, read the epistle and gospel and came to the canon of the mass. The climax, the obvious focal point of the exercise, was the consecration. The Latin words of this were uttered in a very audible stage whisper, and were followed by genuflection, elevation, genuflection, accompanied by the ringing of bells.
Every gesture by the priest, the signs of the cross, the genuflections, the many kissings of the altar, were strictly controlled by the rubrics. There was no place for ``creativity'' or the expression of personality. The authority of liturgy has always been its immemorial antiquity, and this strange, intensely focussed ritual certainly took you back to the remote past. This was sometimes a cause of scandal. The Good Friday liturgy (which was not actually a mass, Good Friday being the only day in the year when mass was not said) notoriously had a prayer for the `unbelieving Jews' (perfidis Judaeis) that God would remove their ``blindness'' and lead them to Christ. Even worse, this was the one prayer during which the congregation did not have to kneel. (John XXIII removed the offensive words in 1962.) There were also curiosities of an innocent sort. A missal published in 1935 contains a Good Friday prayer that God will `look favourably on the Roman empire' and `render all barbarous nations' subject to the Emperor.
The curious thing about the old mass was that it did not much matter if it was performed badly. It often was. Some priests spoke the Latin intelligently and well. Others gabbled it. We altar boys fought to serve the Low Mass of a certain Franciscan priest because he got through it, by means of remarkable elisions, in twelve minutes flat.
The priest was a craftsman, bringing Christ to the altar, and distributing Him to the faithful in communion. In many ways, it was the priest''s mass, to which the congregation were onlookers, or listeners in. Much of it was in silence, with the priest raising his voice at certain moments to indicate what point the mass had reached. In northern Europe and the United States most of the congregation followed in their missals, which were in Latin and English. But in earlier times people would instead read ``prayers during mass,'' rather than follow the actual words. Illiterates would simply tell their beads. Perhaps they looked for angels to fly across, or at the stained-glass windows. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that they, too, were moved, for they participated in a ritual that signified visually and in terms of movement as well as in words.
Participation theology
Vatican II decreed that the people should `actively participate' in the mass. To the older idea that active participation could take place largely in silence and stillness was opposed the feeling that the congregation should always be doing things, saying prayers aloud, reading passages of scripture, presenting the bread and wine for the mass. The priest became less one who offered an awe-inspiring sacrifice, and more like one who presides over a community meal. Altars were turned round, so that the priest faced the people, rather than praying on their behalf to the East, as had been done from ancient times. (Critics of the new order often suggest -- rightly -- that this leads to a cult of the priestly personality.) The first part of the liturgy is now given over to scripture readings, somewhat in Protestant style, so that when the priest goes to the altar to say the actual canon of the mass, this can seem like an afterthought, rather than the focal point of the whole proceedings. The priest''s genuflections and other ritual signs of assent to the real presence, which in the old mass enacted an idea of worship and transcendence, seemed to have been cut to a minimum. For many, the remarkable beauty of the Latin text itself, set by so many great composers over the centuries, and a profound influence on the authors of the Book of Common Prayer, had helped create a sense of the sacred which had now all but vanished.
How did this happen? There had been a liturgical movement, strong in northern Europe, going back to the nineteenth century. It emphasised the intelligent participation of the laity, the use of missals, and a partial return to what were believed to be pre-mediaeval liturgical practices. This led to the half-conscious assumption that there was some golden age before the ``accretions'' that led to the elaborate liturgy of modern times. This was rather like the Protestant idea of the ``primitive'' Church before Roman ``corruptions.''
There was another line of thought. This was that the Council of Trent had been a tragedy just in that it had sealed the division between Catholic and Protestant in the sixteenth century. Trent had re-affirmed the hierarchical structure of the Church, the role of the priest, and the mass as the continual re-enactment of Christ''s death on the cross. The Anglican Thirty nine Articles say that the `one oblation of Christ is finished on the cross .Wherefore the sacrifice of Masses were dangerous fables and blasphemous deceits.' The underlying purpose of the new rite was reconciliation with Protestantism. Its chief inventor, Archbishop Annibale Bugnini, actually said: `We must strip from our Catholic prayers everything which can be the shadow of a stumbling block for our separated brethren, that is, for the Protestants.'
Traditionalists oppose Papal power
To undo the Council of Trent would be no mean endeavour, although to anyone with a sense of the religious history of Europe during the last four hundred and fifty years it must seem a madly ambitious one. But what really ignited the Catholic culture wars was the way it was done: by an unprecedented exercise of papal power. Hardly anything of what happened was prescribed by the Second Vatican Council, not the turning around of the altars, not the almost universal use of the vernacular, not the scaling down of the sense of transcendence and sacrifice, not the discouraging of the faithful from kneeling when receiving holy communion, not the receiving of communion in the hand rather than on the tongue. Traditionalists point out that the Council had decreed that the Latin language was to be preserved. (And the `maniac' John XXIII had been totally opposed to the vernacular in the mass.) It had all been done by Pope Paul VI, Archbishop Bugnini and a close circle of liturgical experts. It was never even passed by a synod of bishops.
The paradoxical conclusion might have been forseen: it was the most pious Catholics, most devoted to the papacy and its prerogatives who were most outraged, but who felt most bound by loyalty and obedience. Their anguish when they were presented in 1971 with the abolition of the old rite can be imagined. (The most popular English Catholic newspaper, The Universe, informed its readers on 26th November that year that `as from this Sunday it is forbidden to offer Mass in the Tridentine rite anywhere in the world.')
Only in France was there open rebellion. Led by Archbishop Marcel Lefevbvre, a thousand or so traditionalists occupied the Church of St. Nicholas in Paris, resisted all attempts to evict them, reintroduced all the old ceremonies, and have been there ever since. The Lefebvrists decreed that with Vatican II Rome had departed from Tradition, and had as good as apostatised.
The bitterness (even despair) of traditional Catholics ran deep. The enthusiasts for Vatican II hailed it as inaugurating an epoch of religious liberty. Yet the abolition of the old mass actually depended upon a Vatican diktat. The Anglican Church has introduced new forms of service, often distressingly banal. But it is impossible to imagine the Anglicans wishing, let alone being able, suddenly to forbid the Book of Common Prayer in all churches of the Anglican Communion. I remember in the 1970s attending out of curiosity a Tridentine mass ``illegally''celebrated by Archbishop Lefebvre in the Great Western Hotel at Paddington. The atmosphere was extraordinary, like that of some improbably enormous catacomb where a clandestine ceremony was going on. Catholics had come from all over England, and many were in tears as they participated in a rite that had suddenly been forbidden them. It was tempting to see this as religious persecution.
Iconoclasm and novelty
The changes were accompanied by an astonishing outbreak of what one can only call iconoclasm, for that is what it literally was. In the University Catholic chaplaincy in Cambridge, the furniture of the chapel, including a charming little baldachino, was largely destroyed at the instigation of the Chaplain. The parish priest of the main Catholic church in Cambridge proposed replacing all the pews with raked cinema-style seats, removing the stained glass, and dismantling their own noble baldachino. (He was frustrated by his congregation, which had been infiltrated by dons.) In my own old parish church, the Franciscans smashed to pieces the whole Byzantine-style sanctuary. Such scenes were replicated all over the country.
There was also liturgical vandalism, especially in America, including priests with red-nose masks celebrating ``clown-masses,'' Halloween masses, dancing-girls and various New Age fooleries. In England, Catholic practice plummeted, and churches were shut.
English Catholics had a special reason for attachment to the old mass. In penal times, several hundred English priests had been executed for saying it. At the place of execution they would often kiss the scaffold, as the priest kisses the altar in the Tridentine mass (much more rarely in the new rite.). The English, more docile than the French, did not rebel. Instead they organised a letter signed by cultural luminaries, many of them non-Catholic, politely asking the Pope for an ``indult'' - permission to celebrate the old mass on special occasions, with the permission of bishops. But their letter did not conceal their feelings of horror: ``If some senseless decree were to order the partial or total destruction of basilicas or cathedrals, then obviously it would be the educated, whatever their personal beliefs, who would rise up in horror '' The old mass ``in its magnificent Latin text, has inspired a host of priceless achievements by poets, philosophers, musicians, architects, painters and sculptors in all countries and epochs. Thus it belongs to universal culture as well as to churchmen and formal Christians.''
The Agatha Christie exception
How could the Pope fail to respond to such a letter, signed as it was by (amongst many others) Vladimir Ashkenazy, Agatha Christie, Kenneth Clark, Robert Graves, Graham Greene, F.R.Leavis, Cecil Day-Lewis, Nancy Mitford, Iris Murdoch, Yehudi Menuin, Malcolm Muggeridge, Joan Sutherland and the Anglican Bishops of Exeter and Rippon? The story goes that Paul VI was quietly reading through the list of signatories and then suddenly said: ``Ah, Agatha Christie!'' and signed his approval. Ever since, this permission has been known in traditionalist circles as the Agatha Christie Indult.
But although this indult had been granted, many bishops were unwilling actually to give permission. The traditionalists, including the Latin Mass Society, were often treated as trouble-makers and rebels.
The authority to change
I once interviewed the Patriarch of Antioch, in Damascus. I asked His Beatitude whether he, like the Bishop of Rome, believed he had power radically to alter the liturgy. `Oh yes, we have authority in liturgical matters. And in fifteen hundred years we did once alter a prayer.' Clearly the idea of virtually inventing a new rite had never entered the Patriarch''s head. (The so-called ``Tridentine'' rite was not invented by the Council of Trent, but was a codification of the Roman rite which dated back many centuries.) The question all along was whether pope and bishops really do have such authority. One distinguished Catholic thinker judged that there was no such sweeping power, that liturgy had its own authority based on immemorial tradition, and that the pope''s authority in liturgy `is at the service of Sacred Tradition.' The same thinker even dared to describe the new mass as `no re-animation but devastation... fabricated liturgy... banal-on-the-spot product.' The man who wrote those words is now Pope Benedict XVI. The Cardinals elected Ratzinger knowing that these were his convictions. It cannot have been done in a fit of absence of mind.
Mass and Invariance
The Catholic Church has often enforced unity with ferocity. Yet in the present culture war (officially denied, of course) real unity seems far away. As the Pope''s intentions become clear (Cardinal Castrillon said that the Pope wants to make the old rite available `in all the parishes' of England and Wales) the English bishops have fallen into a curious silence. The parish priest of a famous Jesuit church, politely asked whether he would make some traditional masses available, responded with unconcealed rage. (This church advertises a children's liturgy, Japanese masses, services for Brazilians and Filipinos, but apparently drew the line at the ancient Roman liturgy). The dispute about liturgy is part of a wider battle. Those who want to align the Church with modernity, which inevitably means drawing on current liberal values, became influential following Vatican II. But if they hoped that the Church would change its stance on liberation theology, divorce, homosexuality, the ordination of women, they found their nemesis in John Paul II . Woytila''s reassertion of tradition in all these areas was less flamboyant than Pio Nono''s famous denial that `the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to come to terms with progress, liberalism and the modern world,' but it came to much the same thing.
Pope Ratzinger is even more profoundly traditional than his predecessor, and he believes that disputes about liturgy are disputes about the very nature of the Church. He prizes a mass that develops according to its own laws throughout the ages. He is also attracted by the Eastern Orthodox conception of a liturgy `whose light illumines our changing times with its unchanging beauty and greatness.' Those who altered the mass after Vatican II thought it possible to create a form of worship that was illumined, indeed determined by the changing times. These are two wholly incompatible visions. As Benedict puts it in a letter to the bishops that accompanied his motu proprio: `What earlier generations held as sacred, remains sacred and great for us too, and it cannot be all of a sudden entirely forbidden or even considered harmful.'
Tradition re-discovered in every age
Something unexpected seems now to be happening in the Catholic Church. Far from attachment to the old forms dying away, a generation of younger priests and lay Catholics is coming into view that is enthusiastically attached to the Tridentine mass, and to Catholic orthodoxy. In France, one in five of all priests currently being ordained is devoted to the old mass. And this is a committed, determined minority growing up in a virtual wasteland for the French Church. Only five per cent of French Catholics attend mass regularly. In one diocese, the Cathedral attracts seventy worshippers on Sunday, while the chapel of semi-schismatic Society of St Pius X (of Archbishop Lefebvre) attracts seven hundred to a traditional mass. Indeed, it is suggested that an actual majority of church goers on a Sunday in France attend Lefebvrist services.
Pope Benedict himself is a philosophical traditionalist of a sort that is barely understood in the modern world. In a lecture to the University in Regensberg he enraged some Muslims because he quoted a Byzantine Emperor who suggested that Mohammed countenanced violent religious conversion. But what he was talking about was the relation between religion and reason. Ratzinger suggested that the God of certain Muslim theologians -- like that of some late mediaeval philosophers, as well as Luther and Calvin - so transcends our categories, even of rationality, that all that is left for us is his sovereign will. If God so commanded, we would have to practice idolatry, or violence. The Pope argued that the Christian understanding of God has to be rooted in rationality: God is reason, the logos, so any attempt to convert by violence is contrary to the nature of God. This may seem an arcane dispute in theology, but what it comes to is that Christianity is inevitably tied up with Greek philosophy, is, indeed, a marrying of Judaic religion with Greek thought. Add the Roman heritage, and we can say (in Ratzinger''s remarkable words at Regensberg) that `Christianity created Europe.'
In other words, Christianity is a culture as well as a set of beliefs. Equally, Europe should remember its Christian roots. (Cardinal Ratzinger once said that if Turkey were ever allowed to join the EU this would represent ``the triumph of economics over culture.'') Catholic liturgies have to keep their Roman and European heritage, and cannot simply be adapted to local conditions, tongues and cultures. The mass in China should not be celebrated with rice and rice wine; and in America it should not express folksy inclusiveness. For Ratzinger, this special blend of Judaism, Greek philosophy and Romanitas is essential to the Church, an idea that Luther scorned. So it is almost literally unthinkable that a genuine liturgy could be fabricated, rather than grow out of immemorial tradition.
Admirers of Ratzinger insist that his traditionalism is no blinkered love of the past, no theological auto-immune disorder. As T.S.Eliot put it, tradition cannot be blindly inherited, but has to be re-discovered in every age, an enterprise that requires great labour. No one who reads Ratzinger can deny that he brings a very lively intelligence into his attempt to rediscover tradition. It is his critics of the ageing Vatican II generation who begin to look intellectually lazy.
In Benedict XVI, Catholic modernists meet a formidable antagonist indeed. His gentle manner and readiness to persuade rather than bludgeon conceals (from those that have not eyes to see) a philosophy of tradition that challenges not only liturgical philistines, but all those Catholics for whom history began with the Second Vatican Council. He is the immediate cause of all those joyful traditionalist Catholics congregating in Westminster cathedral and overflowing onto the pavement. The authority of a pope of Rome is not to be underestimated. When the Pope''s motu proprio became known to Catholic traditionalists, not a few of them wept for joy. At the moment his election was announced in St Peter''s square in 2005, several priests of modernist sympathies were also seen to weep -- but with chagrin. Provided his health holds, then (to misquote Henry James) those tears are not the last they are destined to shed.
(Courtesey:Open Democracy)
AMERICAS
At Sixth Austin Forum, Journalism Groups Unite Around Investigative Reporting
Once a year, the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas gathers members of journalism organizations from throughout the hemisphere under its own roof in Austin, Texas, for the Austin Forum on Journalism in the Americas.
The Austin Forum refers to the annual event and the network of organizations that has attended the meetings over the years. It is dedicated to raising the standards of journalism in Latin America and the Caribbean.
This year's Austin Forum took place Sept. 19-20 and was organized also by the Media Program of the Open Society Institute, based in London.
This was the first time the Austin Forum focused on a single theme: investigative journalism.
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/media
CANADA
Information Access Law Fails to Meet Global Standards, Report Finds
The federal government’s delays in responding to requests for public information and its failures to update the 25-year-old Access to Information law have pushed Canada far behind several countries on the openness scale, a new report claims.
“Ironically and inexplicably, Canada appears to be marching in the opposite direction,” the study says, as cited by The Canadian Press.
The 383-page report, "Fallen Behind: Canada's Access to Information Act in the World Context," was funded by several journalist and newspaper organizations and written by freelance writer Stanley Tromp. (Download the full report and a four-page summary here).
One Ontario newspaper has urged that freedom of information be an important issue in October's federal elections.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government has clashed often with the press over access issues (see video from 2007), came under more fire on the campaign trail this week after his security guards blocked reporters from speaking with a candidate from his party who has dodged questions from the national media.
(Source:Kinght Foundation)
