Japan: Suit filed against Yomiuri over misreport on Dokdo/Five million iPhones to return home...

Media News - Friday, August 14, 2009
Five million iPhones to return home
Finally, it seems the Chinese people are about to be able to legally get their hands on the phone they have been building: the iPhone. According to International Business Times, Unicom, China's second largest cell carrier, has paid 10 billion yuan (about $1.46 billion) to buy 5 million iPhones from Apple. The first batch of the phones will be made available to Chinese customers as early as next month. Since March, the company has been posting the phone's images and specs at its stores. This will be the first time the phone is legally available in the country with the largest amount of cell phone users in the world. Like most electronic devices, the iPhone is assembled in China. The Chinese people are already acquainted with the iPhone. Prior to this, the phone has been available in China, as well as Vietnam and many other countries where Apple has no business partners, via smuggling. What will be new to the Chinese people for sure, however, is the fact that the phone will be locked to Unicom. Yu Zaonan, general manager of the customer development department of China Unicom in Guangzhou, told International Business Times that China Unicom is hoping 5 million iPhones will translate into 5 million new customers for the company. Unicom currently is still far behind China Mobile, the largest cell carrier in the country, both in terms of subscribers and profit. Unicom hopes the iPhone will help it narrow this gap. (CNet News)


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Japan: Suit filed against Yomiuri over misreport on Dokdo
A group of Korean citizens has filed a suit against a major Japanese newspaper for what they claimed to be a misreport on South Korea's sovereignty over Dokdo Island in the East Sea. A total of 1,886 people Thursday filed a suit against the Yomiuri Shimbun, a mass-circulated Japanese daily, for a report in July last year stating that President Lee Myung-bak did not strongly oppose Dokdo being called Takeshima during a summit with his Japanese counterpart. In the suit, they asked the daily to pay 4.11 million won in compensation and print a correction. On 15 July last year, Yomiuri reported that then-Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda informed Lee of Tokyo's decision to refer to Dokdo as Japanese territory in new manuals for middle school teachers in Japan. In response, the report alleged, Lee did not protest the decision itself but instead told Fukuda that "the timing was not right" and asked him to "wait" before announcing the change. Immediately following the report in July, Cheong Wa Dae spokesman Lee Dong-kwan denounced it, calling the story completely inaccurate. Lee charged that the report might have been part of a manipulative effort by the Japanese media to cause a rift among Korean political leaders. (Asia Media)

Complementary for the courtesy :Japan Today

EU expresses concern over jailing of Gambian journalists

The European Union on Tuesday expressed concern over the jailing of six Gambian journalists by a high court to two years in prison and a fine of D500,000 (about US $20,000) each. In a statement made available to PANA in Banjul the EU said it had been closely following the trial of the six Gambian journalists accused of seditious and defamatory publications and noted the verdict. The statement said that the EU was concerned by the heavy sentences handed down and the negative impact of these prosecutions on freedom of expression in the Gambia. The EU reiterated its appeal to Gambia to act in conformity with its international human rights and treaty obligations in considering any appeals. The six journalists, including a nursing mother, were convicted last Thursday. They were arrested on 15 June after reprinting a press release from the Gambian Press Union that denounced comments made on national television by President Yahya Jammeh about the unsolved murder of veteran Gambian journalist Deyda Hydara. (Africa en ligne)
Other stories:
 Brazil crime show host ‘used murder to boost ratings’
 Mobile phone calls lowest in Finland, Netherlands and Sweden, says OECD report
 Loubna Hussein tried for wearing trousers and prohibited travel
 Kids’ search terms: Sex, games, rock ‘n’ roll
 Major changes in Switzerland

EJC Press Releases
Fourth Regional Conference on Innovation Journalism
Journalists from Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, Austria, Italy and Hungary are invited to the Fourth Regional Conference on Innovation Journalism Stanford after Stanford 2009.
Organised by the European Journalism Centre and Vibacom, House for business solutions, the conference will take place on 3 September in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
The event looks at the key points of the IJ6-6th Conference on Innovation Journalism at Stanford University in the United States in May, 2009. It will also discuss innovation as a journalistic topic, education and professional development of journalists and new media business models.
Speakers include David Nordfors, Executive Director of the VINNOVA Stanford Research Center of Innovation Journalism at Stanford University, Wilfried Ruetten, Director of the European Journalism Centre, Claude Erbsen, Director and Consultant, INNOVATION Media Consulting, Grega Repovž, chief editor, Mladina, president of Slovene Association of Journalists; Dr. Turo Uskali, senior research scholar from the University of Jyväskylä, Dr. Noam Lemelshtrich-Latar, Dean of Sammy Ofer School of Communications and Information etc. Download the draft programme here.
The conference targets journalists, editors, communicators and all people working with media, especially in the fields of innovation, economy, technology, IT, science, etc.
EJC has space for 12 journalists, so please apply now! Accommodation and travel expenses will be covered by the organisers. Please send your CV (in English), including your area of specialisation and examples of your work to: Biba Klomp and Estera Lah.
Posted on July 28, 2009 by EJC
Filed under events.
EJC leads innovations in youth media and learning systems
The European Journalism Centre is organising another two-day event in our series of conferences on issues affecting the innovation ecosystem.
EJC has space for 20 media professionals, so please apply now!
The first day, 15 October, will focus on Innovations in Youth Media and explore how basic information, networks, entertainment, user-generated content and classic content can be combined to create new and significant approaches to education. The workshop will have speakers working on the “cutting edge” of the youth issue, including representatives from the World Association of Newspapers, the BBC as well as other delegates from the press and academia doing youth-related research.
On the second day, 16 October, we will join the Get in touch with Creativity and Innovation event in Maastricht while hosting a workshop on the topic of Innovations in Learning and looking at best practice examples.
We will explore novel teaching practices with our keynote speakers, Richard Gerver, one of the most inspirational teachers of his generation and David Nordfors, Executive Director at the VINNOVA Stanford Research Center of Innovation Journalism, Stanford University . We have also invited the Director of the Amsterdam based Creative Learning Lab, specialists in creativity, technology and education and a senior spokesperson from the European Commission, who will bring us up to date on the developments and challenges facing Europe on its way towards a true “knowledge economy.”
Co-founder of the International Curriculum Foundation, Richard Gerver helps schools and authorities worldwide. He develops education systems tailored to youth needs and lectures worldwide on the links between education and industry, 21st century learning and leadership and management.
The Creative Learning Lab inspires and mobilises the educational institutes to make use of digital educational tools and showcases how these can be applied effectively.

Programme details will be online at ejc.net from September, 2009. Accommodation and travel expenses will be covered by the organisers. Please send your CV (in English), including your area of specialisation and examples of your work to: Biba Klomp.

Even bloggers suffer government harassment in Venezuela/

JOURNALISM IN THE AMERICAS
A News Blog


Even bloggers suffer government harassment in Venezuela

Citing a “handful of sources,” the NGO Article XIX adds the case of blogger Alexis Marrero to the increasing attacks on the press by the government of President Hugo Chávez. A warrant for his arrest was issued at the end of July, though he has yet to be taken into custody.

At the beginning of the year, Marrero was summoned to the attorney general’s office, where he learned that there was a criminal investigation against him, supposedly for a blog post in which he declared: “Stop the misery. Death to the traitor. Death to Hugo Chávez.”

N.B.Here in Bangladesh synonymous matter happened in Dacca, Bangladesh.

Typhoon Morakot in Taiwan

TAIPEI, Taiwan – TV stations say Taiwan's military has rescued about 130 people whose village has been consumed by a typhoon-spawned mudslide, but there is no word on the fate of hundreds of others buried by the disaster in the island's south.
The mudslide touched off by Typhoon Morakot inundated the remote mountain village of Shiao Lin on Sunday, leaving at least 400 people unaccounted for. The storm dumped as much as 80 inches (2 meters) of rain on the island before moving on to China.
On Tuesday, authorities said at least 41 people were confirmed dead and 60 were missing after Morakot swept Taiwan. Those tolls do not include the residents of Shiao Lin, whose fate has been unclear since Sunday's mudslide.

Courtesy: AP

South Africa’s unequal prospect/RESEARCH PROGRAMME Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health

South Africa’s unequal prospect
Tom Burgis, 5 - 08 - 2009
The gap between South Africans’ incomes and life-chances undermines their dream of an inclusive future, says Tom Burgis.
5 - 08 - 2009



The vista from among the shacks, hubbub and agonies of Alexandra says it all. Towering beyond the crumbling hostels built for the township's migrant mineworkers are two skyscrapers - the pinnacles of Sandton, the financial district that marks the wealthiest apex of the wealthiest city in Africa: Johannesburg.
Tom Burgis is West Africa correspondent at the Financial Times, based in Lagos, having previously been the Johannesburg correspondent. Before joining the FT, he was freelance and spent a year in South America, most of it with the Santiago Times as Chile attempted to bring Augusto Pinochet to justice.

He has written for openDemocracy's debates on protest and globalisation, and for a year presided over the monthly Bad Democracy Awards.

Among Tom Burgis's articles in openDemocracy:

"Arresting development in Chile" (14 June 2005)

"Michelle Bachelet's hard lesson" (26 June 2006)

"The siege of Hong Kong" (12 December 2005)

"A guide to the post-9/11 world" (8 September 2006)

"Addicted: William Burroughs and a world in heat" (3 November 2006)Few countries have such an unequal distribution of wealth as South Africa. Since the end of apartheid fifteen years ago, the prevailing economic orthodoxy has held that a rising tide would eventually lift all boats. Yet inequality lies at the root of many of the nation's ills.
The rallying-cry of the latest township riots is a demand for basic services - without which poor South Africans' hopes of escape from destitution are throttled. The income-gap serves as a place where crime, violence and Aids ferment.
It was not supposed to be like this. When Nelson Mandela led the African National Congress to victory in the 1994 elections that deposed white rule, many South Africans believed - despite the long-jailed freedom-fighter's warnings to the contrary - that democracy would automatically engender prosperity.
Instead, the new order inherited modern history's most successful attempt to concentrate wealth in the hands of the few. Johannesburg's juxtaposition of dirt-poor townships and plush suburbs is the geographical legacy: a black labour-force near enough to work but far enough away for wealthy whites to sleep easily.
Today the economic pyramid largely retains the shape of the apartheid years, even if a few black notables have reached the peak.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded in a 2008 report: "The most disappointing aspect of post-apartheid economic performance is the emergence and persistence of extreme levels of unemployment, particularly for less-skilled younger blacks, together with the continuation of widespread poverty and the widening of inequalities."
Olive Shisana, head of the Human Sciences Research Council, says income inequality lies behind a potentially alarming rise in the number of young women whose sexual partners are much older.
The girls who slink into corrugated-iron knocking-shops are hardly in a position to insist that their older lover put on a condom. Experts call this "transactional sex", where the wealthy partner supplies mobile-phones and other tokens that serve as a sticking-plaster over the lack of meaningful economic advances.
"If you had a society that was different in terms of access to resources, I think things would be very, very different", says Dr Shisana. "For people to try to equalise, they go to sugar daddies."
It was horror at inequality in its own right, rather than a hatred of the whites who benefited from it, that motivated some of the country's most valuable ideas. Mandela's renowned non-racialism is the most prominent; among the others is the proposal of the white South African Aubrey Meyer - fed originally by an abhorrence of "separate development" - that climate change should be countered by allocating the right to pollute equally among every human being on the planet.
Yet the skewed distribution of resources continues to define life in South Africa.
The wall within
Such disparities - combined with rampant car-theft - have given rise to an entire informal industry: the guards who earn a few rand keeping watch over parked vehicles.
The overwhelmingly black attendants depend for their living on the very lawlessness from which they, rather than those who can afford electric fences, are much more likely to suffer. The gratuitous violence that accompanies many crimes appears to be motivated as much by economic structures that have kept most blacks poor than by a lasting racial animosity.
The other end of the spectrum was recently evident at one of Johannesburg's most chic nightspots, where a multi-coloured elite was plied with champagne as models enacted James Bond scenarios to showcase designer bulletproof attire. What better way to avoid becoming one of the 19,000 South Africans who are murdered annually while still flaunting the wealth that makes you a target, was the barely concealed sales pitch.
Politicians argue, with some merit, that righting the distortions of apartheid was never going to be straightforward. Supporters of Thabo Mbeki, president until September 2008, point to the achievements of "black economic empowerment" (BEE), the policy that obliges leading companies to transfer equity and other benefits to the black majority.
Others, though, say the income-gap is a direct result of such policies, whose main beneficiaries have been a crop of politically-connected black magnates.
Moeletsi Mbeki, the former leader's brother and a critic of BEE, writes in a new book that the policy "strikes a fatal blow against the emergence of black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians, some retired and others not, who have become strong allies of the economic oligarchy".
The new government, led by Jacob Zuma, promises more "broad-based" black empowerment. Yet it seems unlikely that much will change while there persists among those with the credentials to work the system a mindset that was best expressed by Smuts Ngonyama, a former spokesman for the Mbeki government. He said simply: "I did not join the struggle to remain poor."

Also in openDemocracy on South African politics and society:
Gillian Slovo, "Making history: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (5 December 2002)
John Matshikiza, "Johannesburg: shanty city, instant city" (13 December 2002)
Paul Kingsnorth, "Apartheid: the sequel" (20 May 2003)
Nahla Valji, "South Africa: no justice without reparation" (2 July 2003)
Achille Mbembe, "South Africa's second coming: the Nongqawuse syndrome" (15 June 2006)
Achille Mbembe, "Whiteness without apartheid: the limits of racial freedom" (4 July 2007)
Roger Southall, "South African lessons for Kenya" (8 January 2008)
Roger Southall, "South Africa and Zimbabwe: the end of ‘quiet diplomacy'?" (29 April 2008)
Faten Aggad & Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, "South Africa's tipping-point" (2 June 2008)
Tom Lodge, "Nelson Mandela: assessing the icon" (18 July 2008)
Roger Southall, "Thabo Mbeki's fall: the ANC and South Africa's democracy" (13 October 2008)
Elleke Boehmer, "Beyond the icon: Nelson Mandela in his 90th year" (12 November 2008)
Roger Southall, "South Africa's election: a tainted victory" (7 April 2009)



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ANNOUNCE AS COMPLEMENTARY FROM THE MUKTIDOOTH BANGLADESH

The Guardian International Development Journalism
Competition 2009 Finalists Announced

10 August 2009

London: The Guardian International Development Journalism Competition 2009 has now reached its final stages with the announcement of the 16 finalists.

The competition is a collaboration between the Guardian, Marie Stopes International and seven other non-government organisations (NGOs) and was launched in April with the financial support of the Department for International Development and Glaxo Smith Kline. Both amateur and freelance professional journalists were encouraged to submit articles on key development issues before the June deadline.

"We continue to be very impressed by the ability of many journalists – professional and amateur - to grasp and convey such complex issues relating to global poverty and international development," said Michael Holscher, Director of Strategy and External Affairs for Marie Stopes International. "We urge you to visit the site and read not only the excellent articles by the 16 finalists, but those by all the 40 longlisted entrants. It is unfortunately all too rare for the media light to shine on these powerful and emotive issues.”

One of the finalists from the professional category, Rebecca Stewart, wrote on one of Marie Stopes International’s themes, focusing on the appalling toll unsafe abortion has on young women’s lives in Zambia: Legal but they don’t know it. Another, Candida Beverage, wrote a disturbing piece on women’s rights in Sumatra: No money, no baby.

The 16 finalists (eight professional and eight amateur journalists) will be given final assignments relating to international development issues and taken on trips to various countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and the Caribbean so that they can experience and investigate these issues first hand. The winners – one from each strand – will be announced at an award ceremony in November, after which all the final assignments will be published by the Guardian newspaper in special supplements.

The other NGO partners in the project are Amref, British Red Cross, Farm Africa, Find Your Feet, International Childcare Trust, One World Action and Panos London.

To view the articles, visit www.guardian.co.uk/developmentcompetition.

For more information, please contact Nicole Brown at
Marie Stopes International on +44 (0)20 7034 2343 nicole.brown@mariestopes.org

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RESEARCH PROGRAMME



Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health
Research to inform HIV/AIDS prevention, care and impact mitigation

Prof Leickness Simbayi
Executive director
What we do
The Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health (SAHA) research programme specialises in research on the social determinants of health - not only with regard to HIV/AIDS, but also for public health in general. This research goes beyond medical interventions and strives to address health problems at their source, namely, at the social and population levels.
The programme is a national and regional resource for research on the following issues:
• Large-scale surveys at national, community and economic sector levels
• Applied, epidemiological, social and behavioural research
• Health services and health systems research
• Operations research (descriptive and intervention)
• Programme evaluation
• Qualitative research (ethnographic, focus-groups)
• Surveillance and analysis of epidemiological trends
SAHA incorporates the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS Research Alliance (SAHARA), an alliance of partners established to conduct, support and use social sciences research to prevent the further spread of HIV and mitigate the impact of its devastation in sub-Saharan Africa.
South African National HIV Prevalence, Incidence, Behaviour and Communication Survey report released
Scope of work
SAHA conducts research in three main areas:
Behavioural and social aspects of HIV/AIDS
This research aims to understand social (interpersonal) and behavioural (personal) factors driving the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We use this knowledge to develop and test behavioural HIV interventions that are theory-based and directed at prevention of HIV infections in both the general public and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).
Other research focuses on reducing stigma and discrimination against PLWHA; risk behaviour among men who have sex with men; and efforts to mitigate the impact of the disease among orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC).
Epidemiology, strategic research and health policy
This area provides epidemiological support and expertise, undertakes applied policy-relevant epidemiological research, and conducts strategic research that addresses the needs of South Africa and other African partner countries. It covers four research areas:
• Infectious disease epidemiology, with a focus on HIV/AIDS survey methodology and epidemiological modelling;
• Biostatistics, data management and analysis;
• HIV/AIDS intervention research aimed at the development of synergistic prevention and care programmes; and
• Monitoring and evaluation, including assessing the impact of national programmes.
Health systems and social determinants of health
This area focuses on research on developing and evaluating interventions which promote evidence-based health-care provision. The issues dealt with include: disparities in health services; health promotion; the transformation of health systems; and operations research.
The research places a specific emphasis on strengthening equitable provision of health services and investigates how the social conditions under which people grow, live, work and age, affect health.
Regional and international collaboration
Within South Africa, SAHA works with national, provincial and local government departments, other statutory research councils, universities, parastatal and non-governmental organisations, as well as virology laboratories. Most importantly, SAHA has contributed both directly and indirectly, to the development and implementation of the HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-2011.
In the rest of Africa, SAHA has worked mainly with partners based at the Université Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar, Senegal, and the Tropical Institute of Community Health at the Great Lakes University of Kisumu in Kenya. Collaborative work includes government departments, university researchers and research organisations, NGOs and local and international donors. This network has allowed us to undertake several large multi-country and multi-site research studies. Through the SAHARA network, SAHA enjoys a special relationship with the Southern Africa Development Community's (SADC's) HIV/AIDS Unit in Gaborone, Botswana, and the Joint United Nation's Programme on AIDS' (UNAIDS) Regional Support Team for East and Southern Africa, based in Johannesburg.
SAHA also collaborates with many international research institutions and universities outside Africa and with several multilateral international organisations. Longstanding relationships exist with, among others, the National Institute of Mental Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Development and Research Institutes (NDRI), ORC Macro International, Pennsylvania State University, and the University of Connecticut, all from the USA. There are moves to establish partnerships with international research institutions and universities in other parts of the world.
Funding
Although SAHA receives some government funding, being part of a statutory research council (HSRC), the majority of its funding comes from national and international donors.
Within South Africa, funders include: national and provincial government departments; other parastatals and non-governmental organisations. These include: the national Departments of Health, Science and Technology, and Social Development; the AIDS Foundation of South Africa; the Anglican Church of Southern Africa; Education Labour Relations Council; the Nelson Mandela Foundation; the Presidency; and the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA).
Internationally, recent funding has been accessed mainly from the USA's President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief - PEPFAR (via a collaborative agreement with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
Other funders over recent years include the following:
• Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
• British Commonwealth Fund
• CDC Atlanta
• Ford Foundation
• National Institutes of Health (USA), mainly via the University of Connecticut
• SAHARA (drawing on funding from the Canadian International Development Agency, Department for International Development (DFID), UK, and the Netherlands International Aid Agency, DGIS)
• Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
• Tibotec REACH Initiative
• WK Kellogg Foundation
• World AIDS Foundation
• World Health Organization (WHO).
Implementation networks
In keeping with the HSRC motto, Social Science that Makes a Difference, SAHA uses implementation networks to ensure that our research is relevant, properly understood and then implemented. As SAHA works at regional, national and local community levels, it involves key stakeholders at each of these levels. Multi-country and multi-site studies, and most large national studies, have Steering Committees and Boards drawn from relevant stakeholders to provide advice, while local studies have Community Advisory Boards which do the same. In conjunction with the Policy Analysis Unit of the HSRC, we endeavour to convert all research findings into policy briefs for dissemination to key stakeholders.
Themes

Theme 1: Population-based HIV surveys
SAHA undertakes population-based HIV/AIDS surveys, employing the second-generation surveillance approach at national, provincial, and local community levels. These surveys provide essential information for informing policy and programmes in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa and neighbouring SADC countries. The surveys are the primary data source for the government's HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-2011.
Theme 2: National Monitoring & Evaluation and programme impact assessment
The HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan recognises monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as an important policy and management tool. As a lead research programme in the design and implementation of national M&E frameworks, the government has requested SAHA to assist in the outcome and impact assessment of national policies and programmes.
Theme 3: Prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT)
An ambitious aim of the Strategic Plan is to reduce mother-to-child transmission rate of HIV to less than 5%. SAHA conducts research to improve the effectiveness and coverage of PMTCT services, especially in poor, rural areas.
Theme 4: Nosocomial transmission of HIV and TB
Previous studies have shown deficiencies in infection prevention and control (IPC) in health facilities throughout South Africa. In addition, nosocomial transmission of HIV is suspected in several unexplained cases of HIV infection. Since 2005, there have also been multiple cases of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) where evidence clearly pointed to a nosocomial transmission mode. SAHA has undertaken studies in collaboration with Stellenbosch University to improve infection control practices in public sector health-care facilities to reduce the potential for HIV and TB transmission both to patients and health-care workers.
Theme 5: Orphans and vulnerable children (OVC)
One of the main consequences of the hyperendemic nature of HIV/AIDS in the Southern African region has been the premature death of parents of young children which has produced large numbers of orphans. This has exacerbated an already hazardous situation in which the many children are vulnerable because of pervasive levels of poverty also found in the region. Consequently, SAHA has prioritised research into the mitigation of the impact of HIV/AIDS among OVC with a view to identify best practices which help improve both their own conditions as well as those of their caregivers, in line with imperatives of the South African National Strategic Plan on HIV & AIDS and STI for 2007-2011.
Theme 6: Theory-based social and behavioural risk reduction interventions
A set of theory-based behavioural risk reduction intervention programmes under the name Phaphama (meaning "wise up" or "be wise") have been developed and tested over the past few years in collaboration with the University of Connecticut in the USA. These are mainly aimed at providing evidence-based behaviour change interventions, which are being evaluated as a means to reduce new HIV infections. Apart from targeting individuals, some interventions are now beginning to target whole communities in order to try to change social norms. This is also in line with the imperatives of the HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for 2007-2011.
Theme 7: Positive prevention among people living with HIV/AIDS
As more people test for HIV and become aware of their status, one of the major challenges is to promote behavioural risk reduction among them, in order to promote both primary and secondary prevention. A new approach, known as positive prevention, aims to achieve both goals. SAHA is collaborating with the original developers of the interventions and is thus able to benefit directly from their expertise and experience while adapting the interventions for local conditions in line with the National Strategic Plan on HIV & AIDS and STI for 2007-2011.
Theme 8: Research on HIV/AIDS-related stigma and discrimination
HIV/AIDS is one of the most stigmatised medical conditions in the world. Stigmas interfere with HIV prevention, diagnosis, and treatment and can become internalised by people living with HIV and AIDS. SAHA is undertaking research to understand HIV/AIDS-related stigma and how to reduce it in line with the imperatives of the HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for 2007-2011.
Theme 9: Health systems
The complexity and modalities of antiretroviral therapy (ART) have not been sufficiently explained in the South African context. SAHA is therefore carrying out operations research on traditional and complementary medicine in relation to ART in order to identify the most effective ART delivery models in line with imperatives of the National Strategic Plan on HIV & AIDS and STI for 2007-2011.
Theme 10: Social determinants of health
The social determinants of health include, among others, poverty, social exclusion and food insecurity. These factors interact with one another to structure lifestyle choices that become powerful predictors of individual and population health. SAHA is undertaking work to identify and address such factors as a critical step in diminishing inequalities in health.

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Iraqi Kurds assert claims in face of US withdrawal/Medvedev and the new European security architecture

Iraqi Kurds assert claims in face of US withdrawal
Anthony Skinner, 4 - 08 - 2009
A vote on a new constitution for Iraq's Kurdistan Region raises concerns of conflict with Baghdad in the absence of restraining US forces.
4 - 08 - 2009


On 16 July 2009, the prime minister of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Nechirvan Barzani, said in an interview that the KRG and the Iraqi federal government were closer to war than at any time since the US-led invasion in 2003. His comment highlights the extreme tension that has mounted over recent weeks between Erbil, the seat of the KRG, and Baghdad at a time when US forces are gradually withdrawing from the country.
Anthony Skinner is a principal analyst at specialist global risks consultancy, MaplecroftThe current level of friction between Baghdad and Erbil is partly explained by an unprecedented vote in Iraqi Kurdistan's regional assembly to approve a draft constitution on 24 June 2009. The vote was passed with 96 ballots in favour in the 111-seated regional parliament. Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who envisages a strong central federal government, regards the act as provocation by the Kurds, and with good reason too. The draft constitution brings the hotly disputed oil-rich province of Tamim, as well as disputed areas in Nineveh and Diyala Provinces, under the control of the KRG. The draft text also identifies the Kurdish peshmerga as the primary military force in Iraqi Kurdistan, adding that the KRG has the right to deploy the force outside the region as it sees fit.
Significantly, the decision by Iraqi Kurdistan's regional assembly to vote on the draft constitution signals that Iraq's Kurds are serious about their territorial claims in the region, sending a stark message to Baghdad that the departure of US forces from Iraq will not make them more pliant on matters related to disputed territory.
Stoking tensions
All the more concerning has been the increased distrust between the Kurdish peshmerga and federal forces in northern Iraq - marked by what appears to be an attempt by Baghdad and Erbil to exert control over disputed territories. On 28 June 2009, 2,000 peshmerga faced off with an Arab-led Iraqi army unit that was approaching Makhmur, a predominantly Kurdish town between the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. The Kurds claimed that the unit was attempting to enter the town, leading KRG leaders, Iraqi officials in Baghdad and the US military to negotiate for 24 hours for an end to the standoff. The federal unit was then diverted.
Such standoffs could become more frequent in northern Iraq, raising the spectre for tension to erupt into violence between federal troops and Kurdish forces loyal to the KRG. As testimony to the risk, Prime Minister Barzani has warned that fighting between federal and Kurdish forces might have started in the most volatile regions of Iraqi Kurdistan had it not been for the presence of US forces in northern Iraq. The Kurds are understandably uneasy about a bilateral agreement between Baghdad and Washington that envisages a full withdrawal of US forces from the country by the end of 2011.
The KRG meanwhile remains concerned that Prime Minister al-Maliki is not only looking to tighten Baghdad's control over northern Iraq, but also reduce the power and influence of the Kurds in Iraq as a whole. These fears were confirmed when, in May 2009, al-Maliki declared during a television interview that if consensus rule could not be achieved in Baghdad then the alternative would be for majority rule (between 75% and 80% of Iraq's population is Arab, compared with 15% to 20% Kurdish, and 5% Turkoman and Assyrian). However, al-Maliki is not altogether unjustified in considering majority rule in Baghdad given that the cabinet is unable to push its legislative agenda through parliament due to stiff resistance from Kurdish MPs and Arab nationalists.
Personal animosity between KRG President Massoud Barzani and Prime Minister al-Maliki has made the chances of compromise between Erbil and Baghdad over disputed territory in northern Iraq that much harder to achieve. For example, in January 2009, Barzani stated: "We know that there is someone (al-Maliki) who wants to restore dictatorship in Iraq through the control of army and the police." The director if intelligence and security for the KRG, Masrour Barzani, likewise believes that al-Maliki is waiting for US forces to leave and then retake the areas held by federal troops prior to 2003. According to this rationale, only then will Baghdad sit down to negotiate with the KRG about disputed territory. Al-Maliki, for his part, maintains that the KRG has separatist tendencies.
The energy lynchpin
Al-Maliki's view is shared by many Arab nationalists, who believe that Kurdish authorities want to carve northern Iraq into a sovereign state sustained through massive oil wealth. Kurdish officials say that Iraqi Kurdistan has up to 45bn of Iraq's 115bn barrels of oil reserves - a figure that could increase to 65bn barrels in the unlikely event that all of northern Iraq's disputed areas come under the control of the KRG. The Kurds, meanwhile, continue to complain about delays in payments from Baghdad of their 17% share of the national budget, adding that the federal government has even threatened to cut the region's budgetary entitlements.
In this context, it is little surprise that Erbil was angered in late-June 2009 by Baghdad's failure to consult prior to holding an auction for six oil and two gas fixed-fee oil service contracts, including for the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk fields in northern Iraq's Tamim governorate. Kurdish politicians point out that the federal government's failure to engage and discuss the plan with the KRG prior to the auction was unconstitutional, and that the federal oil ministry does not have the right to tender these fields until the status of the disputed Tamim governorate is resolved. Although the service contracts for the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk fields have not yet been awarded, Baghdad's unilateral approach to granting service contracts may have encouraged Erbil to hold its vote on the draft constitution in the regional assembly earlier than planned.
Forecast
The high risk of a military conflict erupting between the KRG and central government could in fact force the two sides together as it not in the interest of either to plunge the country into a civil war. Yet, Baghdad and Erbil have failed to put in place mechanisms to avoid inadvertent military conflict, or its escalation. Concerningly, the US has not managed to establish consensus or a greater degree of trust between the Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. The risk of such a conflict erupting will therefore increase if Washington sticks to its plan to withdraw all US forces from Iraq by 2011, and Erbil and Baghdad continue to provoke each other. The withdrawal would effectively remove an external military force that could intervene should ethnic and sectarian conflict escalate further.

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Medvedev and the new European security architecture
Bobo Lo, 3 - 08 - 2009

In these extracts from his paper for the Centre for European Reform, Bobo Lo assesses President Medvedev's proposals for a ‘new European security architecture'.
Opinion remains strongly divided on the merits of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's call for a new European security architecture. Critics dismiss it as a transparent attempt to split the West. More sympathetic analysts view it as a genuine effort to articulate a security vision for the 21st century.
The general rationale behind the Medvedev security concept is to redefine Europe in ways that are more inclusive of Russia and its interests. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has felt excluded from the continental mainstream. In the 1990s political instability, socioeconomic crisis and sharply reduced influence abroad ensured that it would be regarded as a junior partner at best. Later, as Russia's fortunes improved under Putin, it would be seen as more influential, but also as increasingly awkward and sometimes confrontational. The brief Georgia war in August 2008 marked, simultaneously, the climax of a much-trumpeted resurgence and Russia's alienation from Europe.
All this has occurred against a backdrop in which the EU and NATO have become almost wholly identified with post-Cold War Europe. If Russia is part of Europe, then it belongs to an earlier age: on the one hand, a ‘common European Christian civilisation'; on the other, a loose gathering of great European powers - Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain. The acceleration of European integration over the past 20 years has left it behind, even more of an outsider than countries such as Turkey (a NATO member for more than half a century).
The original iteration of the Medvedev initiative in June 2008 predated the Georgia conflict. It was intended, in the first instance, to limit American influence on the continent. It emphasised that "Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day"; claimed that the existing European architecture bore "the stamp of an ideology inherited from the past"; and declared that NATO had "failed so far to give new purpose to its existence." Crucially, Moscow called for a European summit to start work on drafting a new Helsinki-type charter and, in case anyone should miss its meaning, noted that "absolutely all European countries should take part in this summit, but as individual countries, leaving aside any allegiances to blocs or other groups."
Divide and scatter
The Kremlin seeks to exploit divisions within the Western alliance - between the US and Europe, and amongst the Europeans themselves. Medvedev's original proposal followed on the heels of the Bucharest NATO summit in May 2008, which saw serious splits within the alliance over whether to grant Georgia and Ukraine Membership Action Plan (MAP) status. In the end, they were promised eventual membership, but with no timeline or road-map.
The Medvedev initiative was a natural response to European disarray. The Bucharest summit highlighted the fissures within the Western alliance on Russia policy. Some member-states, notably Germany and France, believed that the West had pushed Russia too far, and that NATO enlargement had reached its natural limits for the foreseeable future. The overt ‘European-ness' in the original Medvedev proposals was designed to appeal to this ‘pragmatic' constituency within the alliance. It tapped into anxieties over the Bush administration's policies towards Russia and the former Soviet Union; a more generalised, if latent, anti-Americanism in some European states; and eagerness to restore predictability to Europe's relations with Moscow.
Longer-term, Moscow aspires to an arrangement that would consolidate its position as the ‘regional superpower' in the former Soviet space; bring it into the European strategic mainstream; and recognise, formally and practically, its status as a great power on a par with the US and the totality of European states.
Some detail, little substance
The first iteration of Medvedev's proposals in Berlin in June 2008 elicited little response in Europe. Only when the Russian president presented a more developed version at the World Policy Forum in Evian in October 2008 did his project begin to attract attention. By this time, Russia's relations with the West - and particularly the US - had reached a 20-year low following the Georgia war.
The biggest difference between Medvedev's Evian statement and his Berlin address was the shift in focus from European to Euro-Atlantic. Although he condemned Washington's alleged complicity in the Georgia war and American unipolarity in general, there was now an implicit understanding that the US could not be excluded from any revised security architecture. In addition to the frequent use of the term ‘Euro-Atlantic', Medvedev highlighted issues that extended beyond Europe such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. Importantly, too, he invited "all key Euro-Atlantic organisations" to take part in a European security conference - a significant departure from Berlin, when he had called for countries to attend as individual nations only.
But the Evian speech remained thin on substance and contained little that was new. Respect for international law, national sovereignty and territorial integrity; the inadmissibility of the use of force; the notion of ‘equal' and indivisible security; and crude criticisms of NATO and its yen to expand - these were the stuff of innumerable statements issued by the Kremlin and Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Yeltsin years.
Arguably, the only conceptual innovation was a new Helsinki-type treaty that would "ensure in stable and legally binding form our common security guarantees for many years to come." But even its significance was questionable. The notion of a ‘Helsinki II' treaty followed in the tradition of grandiose, but essentially empty ideas, such as a ‘global multipolar order for the 21st century', a Moscow-Beijing-New Delhi axis, and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). It did not point to a more contemporary understanding of international security. Instead, Medvedev highlighted the importance of military issues. The assumption that international security is fundamentally about political-military power reflected a realist culture dating back more than 300 years, one that viewed soft power and soft security (political and human) as more decorative than essential.
Moving the goal-posts
But the unfolding of the Medvedev initiative has also revealed Moscow's sensitivity to changing domestic and international circumstances. Europe's relative unity over Georgia, the impact of the global financial crisis and, most recently, a resurgent US following Barack Obama's election have radically changed the external context of Russian policy-making. An overtly anti-American and anti-NATO tone is no longer sustainable. In fact, this was already evident at Evian, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasized that any ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok' security arrangement must be based first of all on NATO, and urged Russia to engage more closely in existing institutions and mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the EU's European Security and Defence Policy.
Moscow is now clearly at pains to smooth out the rough edges in its security initiative. At a time when relations with the US and NATO are improving, there is little will in the Kremlin to upset things.
Does Russia have a case?
It has become fashionable to blame Western governments, above all the US, for the deterioration in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. They are accused of rubbing Russia's nose in the dirt, most notably by enlarging NATO eastwards to include most of Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, Western support for the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the development of US missile defence plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, and a failure to manage Russian sensitivities in the former Soviet Union have generated considerable resentment in Moscow. The current European security architecture, centred on institutions such as NATO and the OSCE, stands accused not merely of failing to alleviate tensions, but of aggravating them to the point of crisis.
On the face of things, the Russians would appear to have a case - the existing security architecture is ineffective in many respects. It cannot stop wars; it breeds considerable ill-feeling, and the Western powers exploit it to promote national and bloc (i.e., NATO) interests. Yet such criticisms should not obscure the fact that international organisations are only as good as their constituent states. Despite the considerable advances in multilateral diplomacy since the Second World War, it is the great powers, not multilateral institutions, which dominate international affairs.
As Russia has demonstrated, and others before it, great powers will not always abide by international law; they will not necessarily respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states; they will sometimes use force as an instrument of foreign policy; they will ensure their security at the expense of others; and they will pursue their national interests in ways they deem appropriate, but that offend the interests or sensibilities of others. The best architecture in the world will not alter any of these realities.
Rather than finding (obvious) fault in the current security system, we need to consider whether it can be improved, even at the margins. Can NATO find ways to become more inclusive of Russian interests? How might the OSCE develop into a more effective body? Can the impasse over the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty be resolved? Would European security be enhanced by the integration of Moscow-backed institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)? And would a new pan-European treaty bring the Helsinki Charter into the 21st century?
‘Fixing' the unfixable
It is difficult to be sanguine about the prospects. Take NATO, for example. The alliance has tried to reinvent itself in the post-Cold War period. It has changed its identity from a defensive alliance countering the Soviet military threat to an organisation that has promoted stability, democracy and the development of civil society in much of Central and Eastern Europe. There can be little doubt that these countries - and European security in general - would have been far worse off had they been left to fester in a kind of strategic limbo-land (or ‘buffer zone'). One needs only to look at the Balkan conflicts to see what the fate of these countries might have been had they been excluded.
Simultaneously, NATO has attempted to engage Russia more closely in security co-operation. In the 1990s, it brought Russia into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, with the potential prospect of eventual alliance membership. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act admitted Moscow to alliance consultations for the first time. And in 2002 the creation of the NATO-Russia Council established mechanisms for joint decision-making in areas of common security concern.
None of this, however, has changed the core perception in Moscow that NATO remains a ‘relic of the Cold War', directed primarily at containing Russia. Although there has been some modest co-operation within the NRC, for example on joint anti-piracy patrols in the Mediterranean, Russian policy-makers continue to regard the alliance as intrinsically hostile.
As for the OSCE, during the 1990s it was Moscow's favourite security organisation. Not only was Russia a full member, but consensus voting rules meant that it could always veto any decision it disliked. The OSCE was an attractive ‘alternative' to NATO precisely because it did not impinge on the sovereign prerogatives of the great powers, Russia in the first instance.
This situation changed after the December 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, when the organisation condemned Moscow's conduct of the second post-Soviet Chechen war. Since that time, the OSCE has begun to exert genuine influence in the area of soft security. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in particular, has assumed a high profile through its monitoring and evaluation of elections in Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia). Moscow views such scrutiny as an infringement of sovereign rights. It seeks a return to the good old days - and the OSCE's ‘core' security functions - when the organisation was almost entirely ineffectual.
The CFE Treaty is one area where there is room for significant improvement. The treaty needs to be revised (‘modernised') to reflect the changes in Europe's strategic map since the fall of the USSR. The present version restricts Moscow from moving more troops to the south, where the main threats to Russia's national security lie. NATO member-states have erred in linking their ratification of an adapted CFE treaty to the withdrawal of Russian troops (‘peacekeepers') from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Moldova. Moscow has rejected this linkage and used the non-ratification issue to justify suspending its participation in the CFE treaty. Nevertheless, all these problems relate to the treaty itself, not to the much broader (and largely abstract) question of a continental security architecture. As such, they should be addressed within the specific framework of CFE negotiations.
Since its establishment in 2002, the CSTO has been Moscow's multilateral instrument of choice - a political-military alliance that brings together Russia's closest allies within the former Soviet Union: Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Although its military effectiveness is minimal, it sends the message that Russia is not without friends, and it gives Moscow something to bargain with when pushing for a more central role in European security. As a result, Russian policy-makers are now calling for a NATO-CSTO ‘equal partnership'. The problem, however, is the enormous imbalance in the scale, capabilities and importance of the two organisations. If the CSTO is brought into a new security architecture, its role will be peripheral. And Moscow will continue to take umbrage at the perceived unfairness of Europe's security framework.
The idea of a Helsinki-2 or Helsinki-plus treaty has found some support in the West. In principle, there is nothing wrong with freshening up the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to reflect post-Cold War realities. However, Medvedev's emphasis on hard security (see above) indicates that a ‘new' treaty, as imagined by Moscow, would reflect traditional Russian thinking. The gulf between the enunciation of supposedly common values and their radically different interpretations across Helsinki signatory states remains stark. A new treaty would inevitably become heavily politicised, aggravating extant tensions on the European continent. (In this connection, the notion that the West could somehow ‘trap' Russia into abiding by commitments to democracy and human rights is delusional.)
Finally, we should consider whether it is even meaningful to speak of a security architecture. Today, more than ever, the conditions are lacking to translate worthy aspiration into practice. Regional organisations are in open competition; there are major disagreements over the legitimacy of European security mechanisms; the values-gap between Russia and many Western countries is wide and getting wider; and Moscow and the West compete for influence in the so-called ‘common neighbourhood'. To promote a new security architecture without addressing some of these fundamental problems is to pretend that elaborate process can somehow substitute for lack of substantive progress.
Back to the USA
The vagueness of the Russian proposals has been much criticised. Such vagueness underlines the fact that Moscow has a far better understanding of what it does not like than of how an alternative architecture might work. Another explanation is that the Medvedev initiative has been overtaken by developments: the global financial crisis and, above all, the warming of Russia-US ties.
The Obama administration has not only talked of ‘pressing the reset button' in US-Russia relations, but has re-engaged with Moscow in areas where it believes Russia can make a difference: strategic arms control, the Iranian nuclear question, and Afghanistan. At the same time, it has downplayed to near-anonymity issues that have previously caused major ructions, such as NATO enlargement and missile defence. The administration's moves have altered the psychological climate and led Moscow to embrace, albeit cautiously, the opportunity to engage Washington on issues where it has both a vital interest and a genuine role. The prospect of a renewed co-operative security relationship with the US has made grand systemic approaches to international security less relevant.
More generally, Washington's renewed interest has encouraged a return to the America-centric tradition in Russian strategic thinking. The EU may account for over half of Russia's external trade as well as most of its foreign investment. But for Russia's leadership, the US remains the main game because it is by far the most powerful country in the world, even if its authority is under greater challenge than at any time in the past two decades. Brutally put, in the Russian mind raw power trumps geographical proximity, economic interaction and cultural affinity.
As long as the Russia-US relationship remains centred on concrete priorities, there will be scant policy space for more conceptual schemes, particularly if, as now, Washington shows little interest in them. But should the bilateral relationship sour then the notion of a European/Euro-Atlantic security treaty could gain new impetus.
The challenge for Europe
The main challenge for European policy-makers in responding to the Medvedev project is that there is very little to ‘bite' on. It was easy to reject some of the early ideas, such as the exclusion of NATO and the US. But, beyond that, getting to grips with what the Russians really want has proved elusive.
The Europeans have foiled Moscow's attempts to divide them from the US and from each other. They have refused to legitimise the notion of a Russian sphere of privileged interests. They have underlined NATO's primacy in European security, as well as preserving a central role for the OSCE. And they have left the onus on Moscow to deliver on the detail of its security proposals.
The real test is whether European unity can withstand a more nuanced Russian foreign policy. Several traps await. One is a misplaced belief that Moscow has seen the error of its confrontational ways. While the global financial crisis has acted as a reality check on the Russian leadership, this will not necessarily foster a more benign attitude towards the West. While Moscow may have softened its foreign policy style, some things remain constant: an innate sense of Russia as a global great power; the conviction that the former Soviet republics belong in its sphere of influence; and a general view of the world as a fiercely competitive arena.
Another error would be to view the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington as an unalloyed benefit. For Washington's courting of Moscow will reinforce the extant America-centrism of the Russian elite, giving new life to notions of strategic bipolarity at the expense of more multifaceted relations with Europe.
The final trap, to which European states are prone, is wallowing in quasi-mythical ideas of commonality. Although EU and NATO member-states share some security priorities with Russia - in conventional arms control, counter-terrorism and combating transnational crime - there are many areas where their positions diverge. For example, Russia's approach to the common neighbourhood differs in almost every respect from that of NATO and the EU. And the interpretation of supposedly universal norms varies so greatly that these have become meaningless as a basis for common policy approaches.
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