Israel vs Iran: rumours of war/Russia and Poland: a friendship that must not fail

Israel vs Iran: rumours of war
Paul Rogers, 2 December 2010
Subjects:
· Conflict
· Democracy and government
· International politics
· Iran
· Israel
· global security
· globalisation
Iran is again at the centre of international politics. Its diplomats are discussing their nuclear plans. Its nuclear specialists are being targeted in Tehran. Its Saudi neighbours are pleading with the Americans to bomb it. But most serious of all, the momentum behind an Israeli military assault on its nuclear facilities continues to refuel.

A recent article in this series noted that a number of political developments in late 2010 were increasing the prospect of an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. These included the results of the mid-term elections in Congress, which favoured Republicans committed to unstinting support for Israel and will constrain the Barack Obama administration’s ability to respond critically in the event of an attack; and a rising Israeli concern with Iran's missile developments as well as its presumed nuclear-weapon programme (see “Israel vs. Iran: the Washington factor”, 18 November 2010).
The subsequent pattern of events, including information contained in the latest batch of documents released on 28 November 2010 by the WikiLeaks project, reinforces this argument in compelling ways.
The new WikiLeaks material provides a trove of United States diplomatic communications from its embassies around the world. Among the most prominent themes of the accompanying media coverage is the reporting by diplomats of several Arab leaders’ antipathy to Iran; the most striking example being the plea from King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia that Washington should "cut off the head of the snake".
This revelation may be interesting more for the explicitness of such remarks than for the actual sentiment, which is hardly a surprise. But far less publicised - until it was picked up by the Weekly Standard, the most prominent journal of Washington's neo-conservatives - was a Saudi claim that Iran was harbouring a network of al-Qaida associates, including one of Osama bin Laden's lesser-known sons, Ibrahim (see Thomas Joscelyn, “WikiLeaks: The Iran-al Qaeda Connection", Weekly Standard, 1 December 2010). This detail feeds a wider view gaining strength in Washington, that Iran increasingly represents an even more pressing danger than had been understood (see Ali Gharib & Jim Lobe, “War cries ringing in Obama's ears”, Asia Times, 1 December 2010).
Any connection between Iran and the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks - however remote it appears to be - is welcome to those in the United States (mainly though not exclusively on the Republican right) already committed to the belief that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are but the latest example of an enduring perfidy, and further justification for attacking the regime; or at least supporting Israel in a similar operation. The logic is plain: Iran supports al-Qaida and is developing nuclear weapons, a process that will end with a nuclear-armed al-Qaida and an even more catastrophic assault on America.
The mindset
The political topicality of this argument in the Weekly Standard is reinforced by two current events. The first is the coordinated assassination attempts in Tehran on 29 November 2010 against two Iranian nuclear scientists: Majid Shahriari (who was killed) and Fereydoon Abbasi (who was injured). They were targeted in an identical way, by the attachment of bombs to their car-windows as they drove to work through the morning traffic by assailants on motor-cycles. The explosions follow a similar incident on 12 January 2010 when Masoud Ali Mohammadi, a specialist in quantum mechanics, was killed in Tehran by a booby-trapped motor-cycle (a case made even more opaque by suggestions that Mohammadi was sympathetic to Iran’s opposition green movement).
The perpetrators of all three attacks are as yet unknown. But it may be significant that some of Iran's nuclear facilities have also been targeted in sabotage efforts in 2010. Perhaps the most serious of these was a sustained cyber-assault which, for example, is likely to have interfered with uranium-enrichment at the Natanz plant.
The second event is the agreement by Iran and the international community to conduct a fresh round of talks on the nuclear issue in Geneva on 6-7 December, the first high-level discussions between the parties since October 2009. The Iranian side will be led by Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili; the European Union’s high representative for foreign and security policy Catherine Ashton will head the “3+3” delegation (Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, the United States).
The revival of the stalled dialogue between the EU and Iran could plausibly be read in terms of a welcome easing of tensions. It could also be seen as indicating a certain weakness on the Iranian side: either as a result of the impact of the current round of economic sanctions, or of difficulties in Iran’s civil-nuclear programme (or both).
The problem is that the other key player in this multi-sided drama, the Israeli governmental and security elite, sees Iran very differently. Israel views any diplomatic move of any kind by Iran as an evasive and delaying tactic which it uses to proceed with its as-rapid-as-possible development of a nuclear arsenal. The façade of negotiations is just that. Iran is a danger tout court, and must be confronted (see "Israel vs Iran: fallout of a war", 15 July 2010).
The threat
The depth of this suspicion of Iran among Israel’s political and military leadership - shared by many in Washington - is well conveyed in an analysis by a prominent Israeli professor in the respected United States defence journal, Defense News (see Efraim Inbar, “Halt Nuclear Iran: Military Action May Be Only Recourse”, Defense News, 15 November 2010). Professor Inbar’s establishment credentials are impeccable: he is the director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, lectures at several leading American and British universities, and is current president of the Israeli Association of International Studies. This status gives his views influence and reach among leading Israeli politicians.
Efraim Inbar’s overall judgment is stark: “Unfortunately, diplomacy has run its course, while economic sanctions are generally futile. Only military action can stop Iran's race for nuclear arms”. This is backed by the familiar case that a nuclear-armed Iran will threaten regional stability in general as well as Israel in particular, not least by encouraging Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to go nuclear. But an Iran with nuclear weapons will also be far bolder in seeking to destabilise Turkey and Egypt, says Inbar, who also strongly rejects the notion that regional nuclearisation could underwrite stable deterrence.
The dangers of Iran’s nuclear-weapons acquisition go even wider, Inbar argues. It will lead the west to lose influence in oil-and-gas-rich central Asian states, which will gravitate towards a nuclear Iran or seek closer security ties with Russia or China; Pakistan too will “adjust its nuclear posture” in response to the new reality of a nuclear-armed neighbour to the west, and India in turn will do the same - “possibly creating an even more sensitive nuclear balance”.
Moreover, the reverberations of a nuclear-armed Iran include two direct threats to stability in Europe: “Iran is allied with Syria, another radical state with an anti-American predisposition, and seeks to create a radical Shiite corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea via south Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Such a corridor will facilitate Iranian ability to project power into the Balkans, where it has a presence in the three Muslim states of Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo. A nuclear Iran could also encourage the radicalization of Muslims in Europe”.
The impact of Tehran’s successful development of a nuclear weapon on a number of Iranian-supported terrorist organisations in the region - such as Hamas, Hizbollah and Islamic Jihad - must also be considered. Inbar says that they “will feel more secure and confident with the backing of a nuclear Iran”.
This article in a leading US defence publication, which identifies the Iranian nuclear challenge as a major threat across the wider region and on to western Europe as well to Israel, is a valuable exposition of elite thinking in Israel. The subsequent Weekly Standard piece - which goes as far as linking Iran directly to 9/11, al-Qaida and the continued peril of attacks (which may now also be nuclear) against the United States - complements this assessment well.
The precedent
The appeal of Efraim Inbar’s view that “(at) this late stage, only military action can prevent the descent of the greater Mid-east into a very brutish region” - especially among those with the ability to act on its recommendations - is considerable. After all, there is a strong precedent for an analysis of this type. A military assault on Iraq to terminate the Saddam Hussein regime had been advocated in Washington for at least four years before it happened; it should not then have been so surprising that 9/11 offered a pretext for a near-instant “framing” of Iraq alongside Taliban-hosting Afghanistan (see Nick Ritchie & Paul Rogers, The Political Road to War: Iraq, Bush and 9/11, Routledge, 2007).
The echoes, with Iran now in place of Iraq, are potent. True, it will take far more to persuade a United States administration led by Barack Obama to engage in direct military action against America’s principal adversary in the middle east. But Israel’s leadership is weighing the options, planning the scenarios, calculating the advantages and considering the outcomes. This time, there will be even less excuse for surprise.
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(Source:Open Democracy)

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Russia and Poland: a friendship that must not fail
Dmitri Trenin, 2 December 2010

Since 2008 Russia and Poland have engaged with each other in a way that would previously have been inconceivable. Some issues remain to be confronted, but they are not insurmountable. Other Russian neighbours would do well to take note, maintains Dmitri Trenin
President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to Poland on December 6 is not going to be a breakthrough. Rather, it will seek to expand and deepen the positive changes in the Polish-Russian relationship. If the momentum which has been building over the past two years can be sustained, that relationship can be transformed into one of the key pillars of stability and security in Europe. If so, it will stand next to Franco-German, Polish-German or indeed Russo-German reconciliation as a foundation of a continent-wide security community.
What has been happening between Warsaw and Moscow since the fall of 2008 has been nothing short of astounding. First, in the wake of the Georgia war, the two countries engaged in diplomatic consultations, with the Russian side sending a signal to the Poles: we respect you and value your thoughts. Then, Prime Minister Putin came to Poland in 2009 to attend the solemn ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II. Before he came, he had authored a conciliatory article in a major Polish newspaper. While in Poland, he not only weathered the criticism directed at Soviet foreign policy, but also had a useful conversation with Prime Minister Tusk while walking with him alone along a Gdansk pier.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin came to Poland in 2009 to attend the solemn ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II.
In the next act of reconciliation, again driven by the Russian side, Putin invited Tusk to come to Katyn in April 2010 for a joint ceremony to honour the slain Polish officers, 70 years after their deaths. Putin even kneeled, briefly, while laying a wreath to the memorial. Putin even kneeled, briefly, while laying a wreath to the memorial. It wasn't a grand "Brandt at the Warsaw Ghetto" moment, but that seemingly natural, even though unexpected, gesture was much appreciated. It was probably there and then that the ice was broken. It was probably there and then that the ice was broken.
The budding relationship was put to the severest of tests three days later, as the Polish presidential plane carrying the first couple and scores of dignitaries crashed at Smolensk. The Russians, shaken as much as the Poles, literally went out of their way to cooperate with Warsaw. For the first time in living memory, they declared a national day of mourning to honour the foreign dead. Medvedev went to the funeral and clearly named Stalin and his henchmen as responsible for the murderous crime at Katyn.
"Thus, it is clear that the engagement initiative was initiated by Moscow and that it was coming from the head, rather than the heart. This is not necessarily a bad thing. National interests are more solid grounds for relations than leaders’ feelings of empathy or remorse."
Dmitri Trenin
In the months that followed, Moscow was satisfied with the outcome of the recent Polish presidential election and did not react at all to the accusations by some Poles that it – alongside with members of the Polish government – might have had a hand in the air crash at Smolensk. The accusations, of course, were preposterous, and evidently a reflection on Polish domestic politics, but Moscow was careful not to unleash anti-Polish sentiments in Russia. Instead, the Kremlin leaned on the Duma, usually a fount of Russian patriotism, to issue, ahead of Medevdev’s visit, an official statement recognizing, beyond any reasonable doubt, Stalin’s responsibility for the 1940 deaths. The stakes remain too high to let anyone spoil Russia’s Poland strategy.
The strategy Moscow has been pursuing with Warsaw had a lot do with Poland, but even more so with Europe. Especially under the Kaczynski Brothers’ tandem leadership, Warsaw made its dispute with Moscow into an obstacle for the wider EU-Russia relationship, blocking, among other things, the negotiation of a new partnership agreement. Russian attempts to lean on the Poles with a little help from its friends in Berlin and Paris were futile: such a breach of EU solidarity in favour of Moscow was never on the cards. In the end, the Kremlin realized there was no way around Warsaw.
However, the Russians needed a pragmatic Polish partner for a productive dialogue, and they saw an opening in the new government led by Donald Tusk, as they later would see one in Barack Obama. They also discovered that Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski was a modern Polish nationalist and not, as they had feared, an American stooge. Having found suitable partners, the Russians began to act to engage them.
Since 2008-9, the importance of the engagement has only grown. The global economic crisis, which hit Russia hard, pushed Moscow to look for ways to modernize its economy in order to remain a great power. Russian foreign policy was redesigned to furnish external resources for the country’s technological modernization. Since those resources were mainly to be found in the West, and predominantly in Europe, the importance of the EU relationship shot up. Warsaw, as the EU’s gatekeeper, had to be managed even more carefully.
Thus, it is clear that the engagement initiative was initiated by Moscow and that it was coming from the head, rather than the heart. This is not necessarily a bad thing. National interests are more solid grounds for relations than leaders’ feelings of empathy or remorse. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that Russia’s present leaders cannot be moved at all when having to deal with the hideous crimes of Stalinism. Even a cynical value-less attitude stops in awe before them.
So, the issue is, where next? What kind of a relationship between Russia and Poland after the reconciliation? First of all, “difficult issues” from the two countries’ checkered history, as they are known to Polish and Russian diplomats, are not all done. They need to be brought to the surface, examined and honestly assessed. Second of all, the relationship needs to be made forward-looking. Polish and Russian youth should be allowed to rediscover each other. Thirdly, Russo-Polish political consultations should become even closer and cover a broad range of issues: Warsaw needs to feel Moscow treats it as a valued and even privileged partner in Europe.