Karachi — political or military solution?

Can military control the Karachi situation? Disappointed by a political government that does not seem to have the will to control the rampaging criminal and militant gangs who are linked to mainstream parties, some sections of society have asked for a military operation in Karachi.

Their argument is that only the military has the will to carry out an evenhanded operation that will hold everyone accountable without fear or concern for individuals and groups affiliation.

Political parties as well as business groups have, on the basis of this argument, called for a military-led operation.

The Awami National Party (ANP), part of the coalition government in the province, has asked for a military operation as has the Jamaat-i-Islami.

ANP spokesperson, Senator Zahid Khan, while talking to Dawn, said his party was closely watching the ongoing operation by civilian law enforcement agencies in Karachi, which at the moment was headed nowhere. “What we have been hearing is that gangs are in possession of heavy arms including artillery, rocket launchers etc., and the presence of torture cells,” he said.

He explained that his party was asking for military action because most of the police officers who carried out the ‘90s operation had been brutally killed. This had discouraged the serving policemen from coming down decisively on the criminal and political elements involved in Karachi. Moreover, he claimed that the city police were heavily politicised.However, despite being aware of and acknowledging the lack of capacity of the police, experts are not in favour of a military operation.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, a known defence analyst, rejected the option. First of all, she said, the army wasn’t trained for urban warfare. Second, she pointed out that the army, if deployed would use extreme coercion, which in turn can lead to public opinion turning against the military.

Tactically, she added, a military operation could not guarantee a resolution. She explained that the moment a military operation started, the people would go into hiding and re-emerge as soon as the army returned to the barracks.

Pointing to the ‘90s, she said that on previous occasions also when the military was called to the city, the intervention only provided a temporary lull; the ethnic and political fault lines remained in place and simply emerged later.

She has a point. After all, the poor situation in Karachi in the ‘90s led to a military operation in 92. The military was replaced by the Rangers and the police, who proceeded to ‘clean up’ the city from 1994 to 1996 but the problem re-emerged in 2008 (or perhaps even earlier) and has been progressively getting worse.

She said it was purely a political issue that needed a political solution on the part of the concerned parties. The political forces have to decide whether they want to secure their immediate interests or work collectively to bring sustainable peace and prosperity to the city.

Her opinion is shared by those who were involved in the two clean-up operations in Karachi in the ‘90s. The first one was led by the army and the second was carried out by the police and the Rangers under the second Benazir Bhutto government.

A former inspector general of Sindh police, who did not want to be named, said the army had a very bad experience in 1992 when the then civilian government called it into Karachi. He said by the time it left, the military was anxious to be out of the city. He explained that this was because of the inability of the military to deal with a situation such as the one that exited Karachi. In his opinion, the army could be called in for a few days but not long term.

In response to a question, he said: “Based on its earlier experience, I strongly believe the army leadership will try its level best to stay away from Karachi, and will ask the government to use the Rangers.”

Similarly, Brig (retired) Imtiaz Ahmad, who headed Intelligence Bureau (IB) under Nawaz Sharif from 1990 to 1993, does not approve of the military option either; instead he calls for giving a free hand to police and Rangers. He added that the military was already facing a hostile environment in the country along with its involvement in the war on terror. Hence, its
engagement in Karachi would make it more vulnerable.

When asked if he was part of the decision-making process when the military operation was launched in 1992 as head of the IB, he said: “It was purely a military operation though the bureau did provide critical information on various criminal gangs then operating in the province.”

He said initially the 1992 military operation was aimed at dacoits based in interior Sindh and later its focus shifted to Karachi where the situation was equally bad.

However, he added, there were some reports at that time that India’s RAW had penetrated into Karachi, adding this might have partly prompted the army to carry out the operation in the city.